John Martin Meek

Home   |   About   |   Peaks   |   My Blog   |   Fiction   |  I Might Just Be Right   |  
Writings   |   Contacts & Links   |   Photos

"The Comedians"—A Sequel

Negotiating with a Dictator:

Trying To Persuade Gen. Cedras To Leave Haiti

By John Martin Meek

Yanick Cedras, wife of the Haitian general who ruled the country after President Aristide was overthrown in a coup in 1991, has become an alleged terrorist.

So says the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

The "terrorist" designation came when Madame Cedras sought a green card while asking for the aid, among others, of former President Jimmy Carter.

Apparently Carter declined her request for help in the procedure. He might well have envisioned a headline such as, "JIMMY CARTER HELPS HAITIAN DICTATOR’S WIFE GET GREEN CARD."

But in a previous situation Madame Cedras reportedly did get Carter’s assistance in obtaining a visa to travel from exile in Panama to Miami to be with her seriously ill mother.

The Yanick/Jimmy relationship began in the middle of September, 1994, when President Clinton sent a small delegation to Haiti for last minute negotiations to persuade the ruling Haitian junta, headed by Gen. Raoul Cedras, to leave so exiled President Jeaan-Bertrand Aristide could reclaim his office won overwhelming in a democratic election.

Heading the delegation was Carter, accompanied by Gen. Colin Powell, who had recently retired as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), then chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

According to media and other reports, an unexpected development during the negotiations was that Madame Cedras charmed the former president and vice versa. Otherwise Gen. Cedras might well have been arrested for trial in Haiti after American troops invaded the beleaguered little nation on Sept. 19, 1994.

But while President Clinton and the Navy command center in the Pentagon repeatedly asked the Carter delegation to leave Haiti with paratroopers en route for a landing at the Port-au-Prince airport, the former commander-in-chief persuaded the Haitian junta members to leave the country the next day.

So U.S. troops arrived in Haiti unopposed and there were no casualties.

Thirteen years later Madame Cedras is restless in Panama and wants to live in Miami. For our government to place her on its terrorist watch list would have been akin to putting Saddam Hussein’s various mistresses on trial with him in Iraq.

Why do I care? Because as a private citizen I was involved with Madame Cedras and the general during much longer and more involved negotiations to get the ruling junta to leave Haiti so Aristide could return under an agreement both he and Cedras had signed, called the Governors Island Agreement.

This is how it happened.

It was very early in the morning, and I had just arisen from my bed to shave and shower. I was in a motel in North Carolina’s Research Triangle near Chapel Hill attending a seminar being held by Glaxo Pharmaceuticals, one of the major clients of HMI, Inc. Communications, my Washington, DC firm.

The phone rang and I was surprised, wondering who would be calling so early. It was no one from Glaxo or anyone working for me back in DC. The voice had a French accent and a slight stutter as the caller struggled to find the correct English pronunciation of her words

Her message was that I must come to Haiti immediately to try to resolve the standoff between the United Nations/Clinton Administration and Gen. Cedras. The embargo imposed by the UN, she said, was slowly destroying a little country that had so little even in the best of circumstances.

I knew a general had overthrown Aristide, who had been allowed to leave Haiti unharmed and was encamped in the U.S. Vaguely, I remembered there had been a meeting arranged on Governor’s Island, where Aristide met briefly with Cedras as they signed an agreement wherein the general would leave at some point and Aristide would return to power in Port-au-Prince, the Haitian capital.

Being in a hurry to get dressed, eat breakfast and show up for the seminar, I explained to the caller that I was clueless on events happening in Haiti and certainly in no position to get involved in some far-fetched and complicated situation.

I did know about the embargo placed on Haiti, and news reports about thousands of deaths because of the shortage of virtually everything needed for survival unless you were one of the country’s elite.

So I said goodbye to the caller and hung up.

That was Friday, Dec. 4, 1993. By Monday I was back in my office, a stone’s throw from the White House, when the woman in Haiti called a second time.

Once more I tried to dissuade her from thinking I possibly could be of any help. And besides, of all people, why me?

"You may not know it," she said, "but you are highly regarded and trusted by many people in Haiti. You are the only person we know who might be able to help and solve this horrible situation caused by the embargo. Please come to Haiti. We need you."

I was flattered by her comments but again told her I was not up to date on the Haitian situation, and could not imagine being in the position to help.

Later that week I mentioned the two calls to a close friend. To my amazement I was told that Michael Kozak, the U.S. Dept. of State official in charge of negotiating with Cedras to leave Haiti, was a neighbor.

On Sunday evening, I gave up my coveted tickets to the Kennedy Center Honors gala to visiting relatives and went to my friend’s home to have a drink with Kozak and his wife to discuss the situation.

Kozak is a career State department officer and as of this writing (August 2005) is the acting assistant secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor

Prior to being assigned to work on the Haiti crisis, Kozak was in charge of negotiations to persuade Gen. Noriega, the Panamanian military dictator, to leave his country so democracy could be restored. His efforts on that assignment ended with a U.S. military invasion of Panama on Dec. 20, 1989, ordered by President George H. W. Bush. Noriega was captured and brought to Miami for a trial that led to imprisonment

Kozak clearly was surprised I had been asked to get involved in Haiti. But, he admitted he had not been directly in touch with Gen. Cedras for months. Without making any commitment on the part of the State department, he said some contact with Cedras to see what he was thinking could be very helpful.

Kozak was not clutching at straws. However, the humanitarian situation had become so dramatic it seemed any movement on what had become a Clinton-Cedras standoff could not be discounted.

So, overnight I became the self-appointed, de facto, secret negotiator between the State department and the military dictator of Haiti.

The next day I made a reservation with American Airlines to fly to Port-au-Prince. When my flight landed in Haiti I was met at the airport by a former government official I knew and the woman who had been phoning me. I will refer to her as Madame X.

My hotel in Haiti was the El Rancho, high up on the mountain above Port-au-Prince in Petitionville—the area mainly occupied by Haiti’s elite.

Since I had more than once confessed on the phone to my ignorance of the current developments in the Haitian standoff Madame X, with Gen. Cedras’ blessing, had arranged a series of meetings the next day at the hotel when I would be updated on the crisis.

It was a long day, including lunch and several hours spent with a former Haitian ambassador to the U.S., who had retired as foreign minister.

Madame X also had arranged for me to have dinner with Gen. Cedras and his wife, Yanick, on my second evening in Haiti at their home in Petitionville.

That night, alone, I was driven to the general’s residence. It was a very modest house surrounded by a wall topped with barbed wire and guarded by young soldiers from the Haitian army.

It reminded me of my previous experience with the West African Government of Liberia. Sometimes it appeared as if two or three guys with BB guns could easily have overthrown the ruling government. When Liberia’s coup led by Sgt. Doe did come, it was one of the bloodiest ever on that continent.

The three of us—Cedras, his wife and myself—had cocktails in the living room, then moved out to a large balcony where a table had been set for dinner. In the French tradition, Cedras spoke only in that language and his wife did the translation. Cedras, I later learned, was a career military officer and had been trained in the U.S. Obviously he understood every word I said. But, having had several French clients in my career, I was accustomed to the language ploy so any misunderstanding could be blamed on the translator.

From the time we shook hands when I arrived at the Cedras home, it was clear that in a strange way he, his wife and I had an immediate rapport with each other. You get that through body language, not from the usual cordial expressions such as, "I am pleased to meet you."

In Petitonville above the masses of people, vehicle exhausts and humidity of Port-au-Prince, it is cool and dry. While a servant poured wine, we ate then sat and talked for hours. Normally translation of a language different from English drives me up the wall, but on that evening it bothered me not one bit. Finally, long after midnight I was driven back to the El Rancho.

The next day, as Gen. Cedras and I agreed, I would draft a plan for his consideration that would end the stalemate with President Aristide and the Clinton Administration. But most of all it would end the devastating consequences of the embargo.

Sitting by the El Rancho pool with a yellow pad and pen, I drew up a plan that would allow Cedras to leave with honor and Aristide to return as the head of state of Haiti. Using the hotel copying machine, my yellow pad notes were duplicated and taken by a messenger to the general that night.

My plan was simple but comprehensive, and went into considerable detail on how the transition of power could come about with Cedras leaving but not in disgrace.

These were the key elements of the plan:

Although I had met and worked on one project with Jimmy Carter when he was governor of Georgia, and with several issues while he was president, I was not a great fan of this president. But I knew Carter as our chief executive had very much impressed my friends in Africa when, early in his presidency, he had come out strong for human rights. As a former president he had begun to gain somewhat of a reputation in international conflict resolution. But, as a practical matter after having met Gen. Cedras, Gen. Walters seemed perfect for the job.

Walters had excelled both as a high-ranking professional military man and as a diplomat. Having worked for years in Washington representing Aerospatialle, Airbus and the entire French aviation industry, the key to me from my experience was that Walters spoke seven languages including French—the major language of Haiti. Walters and Cedras could cut quickly to the chase in negotiations without translators cluttering up the place.

In the situation where Baby Doc Duvalier, who had succeeded his father, Papa Doc, as president-au-vie (president for life), he had been whisked out of Haiti to live in exile in France. This seemed like a logical exit strategy for Cedras, but for France perhaps one former Haitian dictator was enough—with the negative publicity that it was becoming a haven for tyrants. While Cedras and his associates in the coup had been promised amnesty in the Governor’s Island Agreement, it could be argued that since he did not abide by his commitment to leave an option might be a trip to the U.S. in handcuffs. Or, to be arrested by U.S. or UN troops to stand trial in Haiti after Aristide returned.

The next day nothing was happening, and I packed to fly back to Washington. That night I received a phone call from Madame X saying Gen. Cedras generally was favorable to my plan. But Yanick Cedras had gone postal over the idea of Jimmy Carter being involved, because he had been a monitor for the election when Aristide won the presidency.

So far as I know, there was no reaction to Walters. Frankly, I don’t think in the Cedras household they were knowledgeable about Walters and his incredible background in the military and diplomacy.

I did not have to be a seasoned diplomat to understand Madame Cedras was a major player in this game. Yanick hated Aristide and it was obvious she would rather turn Haiti over to anyone other than the slum priest turned politician. But at the White House, there would be no compromise. Aristide had to return as president.

Back in DC I reported on my trip to Kozak, and had a number of calls from Haiti confirming there was a strong bond of trust between the general and Madame Cedras and myself. However, not to my surprise there was no movement by the general to accept any part of my plan for him to honor the Governor’s Island Accord and get the hell out.

Over the Christmas holidays I was skiing in Colorado with Gordon and Tish Imrie, my British friends from Marbella, Spain, when I received another very early morning phone call from Madame X.

She reported Yanick Cedras had indicated to her they were ready to accept some version of my plan for his departure, and I needed to come back to Haiti immediately to work out the details. She said Yanick was looking forward to my next visit.

Gordon Imrie is a graduate of the UK’s Sandhurst military academy, the equivalent of our West Point, and has served with the intelligence branch of the British Army in Saudi Arabia. Among his other military assignments, he had been wounded while serving on Cypress and at one point was an escort for Princess Margaret.

My friend thought my leaving the ski vacation to make another trip back to Haiti was, although he put it more diplomatically, really dumb. It was easy to understand his view of my being a part of solving what had become a major pain in the ass for Bill Clinton—because of pressure from the civil rights groups and Haitian boat people trying to make it to Florida.

I didn’t disagree with Gordo. In no way did I see myself as a nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize or being otherwise recognized for any success. For me it was simply a labor of love for two countries that had no business whatever being in such an untenable situation. And since Kozak was having no other communication with Gen. Cedras, at least I had solved that problem.

Naïve or not, the next day I drove down to the Denver airport and left for Washington. The morning after I was home, I repacked from thermal underwear and down jackets to summer clothes and left for Port-au-Prince.

At my hotel, I was told there were two obstacles standing in the way of Cedras leaving.

First Yanick, the longtime mate of a career Army officer, was immensely enjoying the power that had come with the coup. Second, there was a group of thugs who were carrying out the dirty work of keeping the general in power, and they also were enjoying the spoils of victors.

But Haiti was hurting and the upper class also was being dinged. The prices of gasoline and other essentials were out of sight and it was not easy to survive in business because of the UN’s stifling embargo. However, neither the UN nor the U.S. government ever found a way to stop embargoed goods coming into Haiti over the border from the Dominican Republic.

On this trip I was invited to lunch at the Cedras home on New Year’s Eve, with Madame X also a guest, for more discussion of an exit plan. Before I left for my hotel in the afternoon, Yanick invited me to join them that evening to celebrate the coming of the New Year at an exclusive club in Petitonville. They would send a car to pick me up.

That evening, the driver came to my hotel not to pick me up but to offer apologies from the general and Madame Cedras. There was a change in their plans for welcoming in the New Year, and they did not include me.

Later I was told one of Gen. Cedras’ advisors, probably one of his brothers, felt my presence at the party might cause problems.

With other New Year’s Eve celebrants at the club, questions would be raised about what this American was doing in their midst. The inevitable, but laughable to me, explanation in their minds would be that I was a CIA agent and Cedras was considering a new deal to leave and turn the country back to Aristide.

Madame X, who had called to urge me to come back to Haiti, unfortunately had been misled about the thinking in the general’s household. Mainly it was Yanick’s thinking more than that of her husband, though he was beholden to the other high military officers and the rag-tag civilian gang that had helped overthrow Aristide.

So my friend Gordo had been right, and I took a flight home.

From some computer notes I made after returning to Washington:

"Driving to a meeting at Kozak’s house on Saturday afternoon, Jan. 8, 1994 through the Virginia suburbs with snow in the yards, thinking about the irony of us being out there trying to save a country not that far away where people were lying around their swimming pools.

"My feelings against getting involved until at the end of our first meeting when Kozak seemed to be encouraging me to do it. What must he have thought about me having any chance of success?

"Peter Paul, who had driven me around Haiti many times in his taxi, grabbing me at the Port-au-Prince airport as I was leaving on Jan. 2. And learning that Herrod, a young Haitian who had driven my son, James, and me the one time I rented a car in Haiti, was dead—probably of AIDS."

In the meantime, Kozak most likely was getting no better information on Cedras from the American embassy’s CIA staff in Haiti than what I reported to him any time there was a new development.

After New Year’s, I received a call from Madame X saying she was being dispatched by Gen. Cedras with two other Haitians to come to Washington for an on-the-scene evaluation of his situation.

I set up meetings with key House staff members for the little group. Then I arranged for another event.

My religious affiliation in Washington was at the Metropolitan Memorial United Methodist Church, which bills itself as the national Methodist Church of the USA.

The minister was the Rev. Dr. Bill Holmes, a man of my own age who every Sunday had the opportunity to give his liberal views to some of Washington’s powerful worshipers. Phil Jones, the veteran CBS correspondent, often passed the plate for our offerings and Chuck Manatt, a former chairman of the Democratic National Committee, usually sat in front of me at the rear of the nave.

I asked Bill to set up a meeting where the little delegation could air its views on the desperate situation in their country. My hope was Bill might be inspired to motivate the congregation to persuade President Clinton that the results of the embargo were killing Haitians, and not seriously bothering the upper class.

Bill wanted to invite retired Bishop James K. Matthews, who had considerable experience as a missionary in Africa.

Also attending the meeting, at my invitation, was David King, former congressman, ambassador and a high official of the new Mormon Temple in the Maryland suburbs.

David and I met after he was elected to the House from Salt Lake and I was part of President Johnson’s congressional relations team trying to get his Great Society program enacted into law.

In 1966 David lost his seat largely due to his stand on Right-to-Work legislation. Having been a strong supporter of the president’s Great Society legislation, I recommended to the White House that he be given a job in the Johnson Administration. So, he was chosen for a dual ambassadorship to Mauritius and the Malagasy Republic.

This is an obvious digression, but an incident that happened several years earlier I think is worth a sidebar story here.

In 1988 at the age of 68, David was asked to go to Haiti as president of the Port-au-Prince Mission, supervising 125 missionaries for the Latter Day Saints Church. Soon afterward I went down there on vacation.

There is a feeling in many of us that when we like two people, if we somehow get them together they will like each other. Of course it doesn’t always work, but there’s a bit of hubris if it does.

So one day while in Haiti I invited David and a friend, who had served in Haiti’s foreign ministry, to join me for lunch at a Petitionville restaurant.

After we had been seated my foreign ministry friend said to David, "You know, Mr. Ambassador, I am a student of Haitian history and the name King is very important in the background of our country."

David and I nodded.

"When Haiti was occupied by the American Marines from 1915 to 1934," my friend continued, "there was a a Senator King in your country who led the effort in Congress to give us back our freedom."

My friend paused.

"Yes," said David, "I understand. Senator King was my father, and the first time I visited Haiti was when as a young child I accompanied my parents here so your government could present him with a special honor."

The meeting at the church was cordial but accomplished nothing.

I very much wanted to take Bill Holmes and Bishop Mathews to Haiti to see firsthand the terrible effects of the embargo on those outside the ruling class, which was its intended target.

My thinking was that perhaps after such a trip they could hold a news conference with other clergy, and make an appeal to President Clinton to end the embargo and save thousands of lives. In addition I could have arranged for them to meet with Gen. Cedras to express their concerns about the damage being done by his bringing on the embargo.

My problem was I had a business to run and the immediate need to begin shooting a video with Walter Cronkite from Arizona to New York City. So the group with Madame X returned to Haiti with little accomplished.

However, when I met them for dinner at their hotel the night before they were to leave, I told them word had been passed to me that they should delay their flight to Port-au-Prince because of "security" reasons.

Time moved along with no progress in dislodging the junta. Then in February, through a call from Kozak, I became aware of a developing crisis that potentially would put Cedras in an even more unfavorable public relations situation—if that were possible.

CARE, the Catholic Service Organization and other charitable groups had been providing food and some health assistance to the poor Haitians every day who otherwise would have starved or died of health problems as a result of the embargo.

According to a paper written by Richard E. Hull in March, 1997, at the National Defense University, at a Nov. 12, 1993 press conference President Clinton "noted that food supplies sent to Haiti, which were excepted under the sanctions, were feeding 650,000 persons a week, and that the de facto regime, rather than the embargo, was to blame for any suffering because of this regime’s refusal to comply with the Governors Island Agreement. He added that he had ordered improvements in the delivery of medical supplies and medical care to the population of Haiti."

For someone who was on the ground in Haiti several times during the embargo, the president’s statement is quite incredible. The question was how could a so-called civil society such as our own deliver such terrible hardships on the poor of the poorest nation in this hemisphere, and then use the excuse that it was all the junta’s fault?

It reminds me of a story told years ago by an official at what is now the Agency for International Development—that arm of the Department of State that administers foreign aid.

Two priests in Calcutta were discussing the appalling poverty among the teeming masses of that city.

"A solution that would be of much help," said one priest, "is a massive program of birth control."

The other priest looked at him in disbelief.

That could never happen," he said. "You know the Holy Father’s position on birth control!"

"Yes, I know the Holy Father’s position," said the first priest. "But the problem is, the Holy Father has never been to Calcutta."

During the 1993-94 time frame on March 8, 1994, David Rogers of CARE testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the desperate situation of the Haitians under the UN embargo.

"In January, 1992, " Rogers said, "CARE’s food programs targeted 20,000 people. Now just two years later, CARE’s plan calls for the distribution of daily supplemental food to 620,000; i.e., 300,000 in a regular program for nutritionally vulnerable and an additional 320,000 at risk because of the present emergency situation."

So the relief organizations had the food and health care provisions President Clinton mentioned, but the fuel supply for the vehicles taking it throughout the country was depleted.

A tanker loaded with gasoline, Kozak said in his call, was on the way to Port-au-Prince and could supply needed fuel to the relief groups.

However, a tanker taking fuel to Haiti for charitable purposes—permitted under the UN embargo rules—was nothing new. The problem was when the ships docked, the thugs operating under the Cedras government were confiscating the gasoline and selling it on the black market. If it happened again, the hundreds of thousands of Haitians depending on CARE and others for food and medical supplies would be at risk.

Cedras now was depending on me for some of his public relations advice, another indication of the trust that had developed between us. It seemed to me the general, as a professional soldier, did not want to be portrayed in America as a ruthless dictator but someone who was saving his country from an incompetent leader.

The fax machine the general used was in his home, not at his office where his staff might see our communications. So I sent him an urgent fax explaining the enormous amount of negative publicity he would receive in the U.S. if his people confiscated the gasoline from the tanker that soon would be docking in Port-au-Prince.

A response came back. He gave me his word the fuel would go to the relief organizations, and it did. Sometime in the next few days Kozak called to thank me for my efforts.

Since I received no more calls of this nature from Kozak apparently, but I am in no way certain, that tanker of fuel lasted for the relief groups until the invasion, Aristide returned and the embargo was lifted.

Another similar situation arise during my negotiations with Cedras.

When I returned home from dinner one evening around midnight, there was a urgent phone message from a friend in Oklahoma City who was public relations director for Larry Jones and his Feed the Children organization.

I returned her call, and she told me The Feed the Children warehouse in Port-au-Prince (later confirmed by footage on one of the organization’s television programs) was completely empty. But Feed the Children had a chartered Boeing 707 at the Miami airport loaded with supplies ready to fly to Haiti.

The problem, my friend said, was that Cedras’ people would not let the plane land at the Duvalier Airport in Port-au-Prince. I asked why Cedras would stop the Feed the Children plane since the organization had been operating freely in Haiti where Larry Jones, an Oklahoma minister, had founded it several years earlier.

She said a few days ago Jones had flown to Haiti with Rep. Charles Rangel (D-NY) and his House of Representatives associate, Ben Gilman (R-NY), who were leading the effort in Congress to rid Haiti of Cedras and restore Aristide to power. The Cedras people were retaliating for Jones’ associating with the two congressmen.

Midnight is never late in Haiti, so I called the Cedras home to make yet another plea that the Feed the Children plane be given landing rights. One of the general’s brothers, whom I had not met, answered the phone and said the general and his sister-in-law were out for dinner. He confirmed that Gen. Cedras was angry over the Jones trip to Haiti with Rangel and Gilman, and Feed the Children was no longer welcome down there.

Unlike Gen. Cedras, the brother spoke to me in excellent English. I told him I agreed Jones might have made an unintended political mistake by going to Haiti with the congressmen, but it was a much larger error in judgment on his brother’s part to deprive starving people of the supplies Feed the People was providing.

The Feed the Children cargo plane literally was on the runway at the Miami airport. As some point, I was told, the pilot received word his aircraft with the desperately needed supplies had been cleared to land at the Haitian airport.

My friend said Jones would be calling to thank me for my help, but he never did. Perhaps he thought that because I had been able to reverse the decision to keep Feed the Children out of Haiti, I had become part of the Cedras crowd.

I wanted to talk to Jones, not to receive his thanks which in a way would have been a meaningless gesture considering the recipients of that plane load of food and other essentials. Since Feed the Children had been founded in Haiti, I was eager to learn more about how it was started and Jones’ goals for the organization short and long term.

But helping on these two relief efforts was not a permanent fix for the problem of the charitable organizations with their food distribution program.

A New York Times story datelined Aug. 22, 1994 from Port-au-Prince said more than 500,000 gallons of diesel fuel and gasoline had been stored there by the Haitian government since shipments began arriving that year, while relief organizations were using up the last of their supplies.

One source for the Times story was Ross Mountain, relief coordinator in Haiti for the United Nations.

"The fuel program is the essential part of the total operation," Mr. Mountain said. "It is vital to the provision of water in and outside Port-au-Prince, the transportation of food, the function of hospitals, the transportation of medical supplies, and essential to the lives of millions of Haitians." (italics not mine)

According to the story, the 500,00 gallons in the clutches of the government would have carried the relief groups through September and October.

The story continues:

"Without that fuel," the Times reported, "millions of Haiti’s poor in the countryside will almost certainly endure more hardship because they depend on food provided by aid groups. People who depend on hospitals and medicines in the cities and all over Haiti will suffer and die, say relief workers who did not want to be identified for fear of angering the Haitian Government."

For the purposes of this narrative, it is important that somewhere in here there must be a caveat that I should hedge on the precise dates of some of these events.

Prior to moving to Arizona from Washington late in 1999, I already had misplaced—apparently in an office move in 1996—my diary for 1993. In the move to Arizona, my 1994 diary was misplaced. But the notation made on my office computer is that I was working on the Feed the Children problem on July 5, 1994. A note to the Rev. Dr. Bill Holmes thanking him for setting up the meeting, and mentioning the tanker problem, is dated Feb. 27, 1994.

Reading several drafts of this document, Madame X proved helpful in filling in some of the gaps in my memory about situations I overlooked.

In searching through hundreds of videotapes in my collection, I found two that had interviews with Cedras.

One is an ABC Evening News segment where the late Peter Jennings went to Haiti to do an on-the-scene report. Unfortunately, the tag with the date is missing but I’m guessing it was in the spring of 1994.

Early on in his report, Jennings says Air France was ending its flights to Haiti at the end of the month, and there would be no other flights for the future.

Jennings also refers to a Cedras statement suggesting a U.S. invasion of Haiti would be met with some resistance, but pointed out quite accurately that Cedras hadn’t much of an army to present any threat to our forces.

Cedras also was interviewed by Jennings. In this discussion, it was mentioned that Congress might appoint a commission to negotiate with the junta. Cedras said, in French, if that happened he would be available to meet with the commission.

Around the first of May, 1994, through a trusted friend in the media, only one of two or three people who knew of my "mission impossible" in Haiti, I was approached by an NBC "Meet the Press" producer to ask Gen. Cedras to appear on the program.

Cedras agreed, and on May 5, Mothers Day, he appeared on "Meet the Press" and was questioned by host Tim Russert and David Broder of The Washington Post.

Inasmuch as one of the services offered by my firm, HMI, Inc. Communications was a seminar on "meeting the media," I was asked by Madame X to send Cedras a memo about various aspects of this important appearance.

First, I recommended that he speak in English. But in the entire interview only one of his sentences was not in French.

In other recommendations I suggested he chose an attractive background, wear a dark suit, blue shirt and a solid-color tie to enhance his sallow features.

All my advice was ignored. For the interview he sat in front of a wood paneled wall, probably in the Army headquarters. His clothing looked as if it had come from a bargain basement sale.

Responding to the Russert and Broder questions, his thin lips hardly moved as he spoke in a barely audible voice.

Looking back on this program from the perspective of more than a dozen years, the best description that comes to me is "quaint."

The translation from French to English and back to French on such a long interview was terrible. When we watch the news and see an Iraqi on TV in a sound bite talking about a bombing he’s witnessed, translation is necessary and okay for a few seconds. But on the long "Meet the Press" interview with Russert and Broder it was deadly.

The program began with an interview with Randall Robinson, at that time executive director of TransAfrica, then in his 27^th day of a fast protesting the treatment of Haitian refugees fleeing their country for the U.S.

Robinson said he had just received a call from Anthony Lake, President Clinton’s national security advisor, saying the administration had changed its policy and would be granting asylum in the U.S. for the Haitian refugees. Therefore he was ending his hunger strike, and said the change in U.S. policy would save hundreds or thousands of lives.

Robinson was followed by Cedras and the tedious translations from English to French and vice versa.

A key issue at the time was what to do with the Haitian refugees trying to make it to Florida by boats. When they were picked up at sea by Navy or Coast Guard vessels, the big question was who among the Haitians were political refugees whose lives were in danger and which ones were just seeking, as Cedras said at one point, "the American Dream."

To segue from the "Meet the Press" interview for a moment, it is beyond my comprehension that any Navy or Coast Guard crewmember could honestly make such a judgment—even if a Haitian refugee spoke English or someone among our naval crews spoke French. In other words, what possible evidence could any Haitian at sea produce indicating his or her life was threatened by the junta thugs?

These criteria were never discussed on the program and I have no idea how a decision would be made about who went back to Haiti and who would be granted asylum in this country because whoever rules in Haiti does not publish a hit list. Going back decades, Haitians have just been killed because someone had the power to do it without fear of reprisal as Stalin is alleged to have killed millions of his own people in the Soviet Union because he could.

Back to "Meet the Press."

Cedras pretty much stayed on message in suggesting "dialogue" was the way to solve the crisis, and what he meant by that I suppose only he would know.

Broder weighed in with questions about whether the general would step aside for amnesty (guaranteed to junta members in the Governor’s Island Accord) and would he stop Haitian refugees fleeing from their country. He received no clearer answers than had Russert.

Tim than said that new sanctions were going to be put into place some two weeks later on May 21 unless the general stepped down.

"Will you?"

"dialogue."

Russert then said President Clinton would be speaking about Haiti later that day at a news conference. Was there anything Cedras would like to say to Clinton?

"I would like to say," Cedras replied in perfect English, "in the name of justice to review the situation of Haiti."

And the interview was over.

Next on the program came Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chair of the House Foreign Relations Committee and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), an African American outspoken on human rights issues.

Russert went right to the jugular with Rep. Waters, asking her if she was willing to accept Haitian refugees in California.

Throughout her part of the interview, Rep. Waters was as evasive as Cedras. Her answer to the situation did not waiver. Restore Aristide to power, and there will be no refugees in Florida or elsewhere.

Rep. Hamilton was asked the same question, and he responded that Indiana would be willing to take its share of the political refugees while those who left Haiti for economic reasons should be returned.

Rep. Hamilton, who has long been retired from Congress and has since served as co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, said he was opposed to using military force at that time. Within the context of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, he wisely commented that the problem (of a U.S. invasion of Haiti) "is how you get them out."

Both Rep. Waters and Rep. Hamilton agreed Cedras in his comments had been very vague. Dialogue. What dialogue?

Broder did raise the question of how to tell political from economic refugees. Rep. Waters responded, "We will be fair."

Then Broder asked Rep. Hamilton if Congress would support U.S. military intervention in Haiti.

"Not now," was the answer. Later, Rep. Hamilton wryly remarked that when the U.S. now uses military force against another nation (Grenada and Panama for example), Congress usually is in the position of approving the action after the fact.

Another noteworthy comment by Rep. Hamilton was the wise observation that when President Aristide did return to Haiti he would need to broaden his base, especially with the Haitian Parliament, to build a national consensus. And he advised President

Clinton to not use military force against Haiti without congressional approval.

In having just the most basic knowledge and understanding of Haiti is to personally experience its enormous poverty with the accompanying lack of decent housing, health care, sanitation, education and the opportunity for employment.

What was missing from all the discussion on the "Meet the Press" program that day, which was par for the course with any discourse about Haiti, was a single word addressing these terrible problems. Absent any president short of Jesus Christ and the working of miracles, under the massive poverty situation it hardly mattered who headed Haiti whether it be Aristide, Cedras or anyone else.

There is a line in an old Kris Kristofferson song, "Me and Bobby Magee," lamenting that "freedom is just another word for nothin’ left to lose, and nothin’ ain’t worth nothin’ but it’s free." And having freedom for the people of Haiti really is almost worthless without a serious effort to address this overwhelming state of poverty among the vast majority of the Haitian people.

Back in Haiti, I was told, the Cedras crowd reportedly thought it was by far the general’s best interview at explaining why he reneged on the Governor’s Island agreement.

From the viewpoint of the American viewers of "Meet the Press," I think the interview was disastrous—the general’s somber look, his refusal to respond directly to questions, the background and his choice of dress.

But, understanding why the interview was perceived as positive is to have an understanding of Haiti and not measure other countries of the world by our own system of fitting square and round pegs into square and round holes.

Down in Port-au-Prince among the elite in their homes in Petitionville, the general was a success because he had not flinched at the tough questions by Russert and Broder, he had kept his cool and stayed on the vague message of "dialogue."

What we Americans saw on "Meet the Press" was not Gen. Cedras as I came to know him.

I have been an advisor to world leaders from Japan to (post Idi Amin) Uganda and one of my major criteria for measuring such people simply is this: does he, or she, have a sense of humor?

On my first visit with Cedras I quickly learned he did have a sense of humor, was actually very personable and seemed to care deeply about his country. This does not mean, however, that I condoned the coup or his refusing to honor his part of the Governor’s Island Agreement.

To back up a bit from the "Meet the Press" interview, on Feb. 17, 1994, I faxed a memo to Cedras about a delegation from the Haitian Parliament that was in the U.S. to try to work out a new agreement between Cedras and President Aristide.

The delegation was meeting with Aristide that afternoon, according to my memo, and planned a news conference the next day.

There would be no negotiating and no signing if both Aristide and Cedras agreed to the proposal from the delegation.

I faxed the story of the plan to Cedras and in a memo told the general my government sources had conveyed to me the message that this crisis had to have closure in the immediate future. I urged him to accept the plan and announce his decision as soon as possible.

But Aristide rejected the plan. From my view in DC, the junta could have had a small public relations coup by going along with what the delegation proposed.

On Feb. 15 a Reuters story reported on a State department briefing on the plan. The story said: "At the same time, the United States Tuesday circulated a Security Council resolution that sharply tightens the trade embargo against Haiti, grounds private aircraft and freezes some financial assets.

"But the hearts of some senior U.S. officials involved with Haiti policy are clearly not behind the resolution. One senior official said Monday Washington did not want to destroy the Haitian economy and society and make the country ungovernable for Aristide or any other democratic government."

In my opinion, the sanctions imposed on Haiti already had accomplished that and any new embargo restrictions probably would have made little difference.

During this time I was on the phone with Madame Cedras one day and it seemed she finally was ready to leave. However, as we talked Yanick received word the Haitian legislature’s delegation plan had been warmly received in Washington. Suddenly in a 180-degree turn, Yanick in great anger reversed herself and we were back to square one.

Knowing I had a straight pipeline to Mike Kozak, Yanick used me like a yoyo with her calls and erratic behavior. My guess is that Kozak’s superiors who were briefed on this strange negotiation triangle must have been laughing themselves silly over what I communicated to Mike. And I wouldn’t blame them.

But I did have one card up my sleeve the mighty State department, the CIA and the Clinton White House could not trump. I was the only one in the U.S. who had a continuing line of communication directly to the Cedras household.

Ironically, in September, 1994, as the Haitian crisis was near the top of the White House agenda, Jimmy Carter came forward offering himself as the official representative of President Clinton to get Cedras to leave and Aristide back in power.

How did Carter get involved? Remember earlier I wrote that Yanick Cedras was livid at the suggestion in my original exit strategy plan that the Haitians might accept President Jimmy Carter as a high-level negotiator?

Jimmy Carter got into the act because he received a very important phone call asking for his help. That call came from Gen. Raoul Cedras.

At this point Clinton was tired of the pressure being exerted by the human rights groups and the lack of any movement by the State department in getting Cedras to leave, so he reluctantly accepted Carter as his negotiator.

I think reluctantly because Jimmy Carter, perhaps always with all good intentions, had become somewhat of a loose canon in his international crisis resolution efforts. And of course it seems just human that a sitting president does not want his own administration to seem so inept it has to accept help from a former president even though both are Democrats.

But Clinton, ever wise in many ways, was not going to turn Carter loose alone in Port-au-Prince with his sometimes over-the-edge diplomacy. As insurance, the commander-in-chief sent along an African-American Army general who happened to be Colin Powell, retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and architect of the quick victory in Operation Desert Storm.

Filling out this delegation was U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Nunn had managed in his Washington career to keep one foot in the conservatism of the South and the other in the center or edging slightly toward the left on some issues.

Gen. Powell’s trip with Carter and Nunn had an unexpected sidebar. What is not known, perhaps even to the general himself, is that Yanick Cedras was not just one of his admirers. During his mission to Haiti, she fell in love with him.

Nevertheless, love or no love, Yanick still was not prepared to surrender all that power and leave Haiti for some other country.

In fact, in this time frame Cedras began to plan a new presidential election with himself as the leading candidate. After a few practice runs to "campaign" outside Port-au-Prince, the reception was so cold the election idea soon was shelved. The point is Cedras and his wife were trying to create any scenario possible so he could continue as Haiti’s ruler.

Privately, Clinton was ready to send Army paratroopers to take over the country and rid himself of this crisis. A long-standing pest named Fidel Castro was problem enough in the Caribbean area.

Carter, Nunn and Powell flew to Haiti and began negotiations with Gen. Cedras. Viewing one side of his persona, Carter is a somber, strictly businessperson most of the time. But he also has a charming side when he sees it will help him achieve the kind of success that earned him a dark-horse victory in the race against President Ford.

According to the cliffhanger media reports that Sunday night, Carter refused to leave Haiti not having solved the crisis—even though U.S. military aircraft with paratroopers were in the air ready to invade the little country. Not knowing what might happen, Clinton was urging Carter to get the hell out lest he be caught up in any dangerous situation.

Dangerous situation? That to me is laughable, but here are some excerpts from what the late David Halberstam wrote in his incisive book, "WAR IN A TIME OF PEACE—BUSH, CLINTON, and the GENERALS." (Touchstone, 2001)

"By September (1994), the plan was mostly in place. The orders from the White House were that the invasion was to be kept to a force of under twenty-two thousand men—actually it would be closer to twenty-five. The 82^nd Airborne would be launched from Fort Bragg. Elements of the 101^st Airborne were sitting nearby on a ship ready to join in, and a force of about two thousand marines would hit the shores. To complete the assault, the Tenth Mountain Division would come ashore almost as soon as the airborne troops had landed. Even before the invasion was set in motion some Special Forces units would go ashore to take out any Haitian armored vehicles."

Then this:

"By mid-September they were ready for the invasion. Then things became complicated. Jimmy Carter, the former president, had valuable contacts in Haiti including some with members of the junta. He understood that some form of invasion was about to take place and volunteered to lead a negotiating team to try to get the junta to leave peacefully. Clinton was delighted to avoid the outright use of force to remove the junta, but he was also wary of Carter."

Later:

"So it was a politically loaded, somewhat risky idea. In the eyes of the White House, Carter was hard to control, and he tended to freelance and thereby, they feared, play into the hands of the local bad guys. Still, if it was not an ideal option, nothing in Haiti was ideal, and one last effort for peace would be reassuring to other Latin American nations in showing that we had not wanted to practice gunboat diplomacy. So even as the invasion countdown was taking place, Clinton decided to send Carter, Powell and Nunn."

Many years ago Graham Greene published a major novel called "The Comedians," which was a barely fictional account of Haiti during the brutal reign of Papa Doc Duvalier. If Greene had been alive when this charade played out at the White House, State department and in Haiti, he surely would have died again—this time laughing himself to death.

So would other "old Haitian hands" such as Mike Wallace of CBS’ "60 Minutes," Actors Martin Balsam and Ali McGraw—along with many others who had spent time there—see the absolute craziness of this piece of our so-called foreign policy.

Twenty-five thousand troops? Haitian armored vehicles?

In my numerous trips to Haiti, including the two on my mission impossible, the only armored vehicle I ever saw was an old tank on the Presidential Palace grounds. The story was they were trying to move it to some other location, apparently in the Papa Doc era, when the motor died and it was left there to rust as a kind of oxymoronic symbol of Haitian military power.

The CIA did not have to depend on the U.S. embassy military attaches and CIA spook contingent in Port-au-Prince to size up the Haitian military threat to our troops invading the country.

Its operatives could have gone there as tourists and traveled the country freely to make an estimate of Haiti’s pathetic military situation. Having thought about it many times, I cannot believe those young Haitian army guys loafing around the Cedras house perimeter would have fired a shot had a few Marines appeared at the gate in one Humvee.

But Clinton, perhaps out of jealousy, underestimated Carter. Just before troops were to land at the Port-au-Prince airport, the former president on Sunday, Sept.19 reached an agreement with Cedras and other Haitian government officials to leave the country the next day. Or so he thought.

Kozak was in Port-au-Prince then and I assume (but do not know for sure) he was at Carter’s side during the negotiations at the Army headquarters and elsewhere.

After Kozak returned to Washington, he told me the U.S. delegation still in Haiti (Carter had left the country Sunday night before the U.S. troops began landing) went to Cedras’ office on Monday morning. A motorcade was waiting to take Cedras and his family to the airport, where they would be flown to exile in Panama.

Cedras, Kozak said, showed up as if it was business as usual and his agreement with Carter the evening before had never happened. The Americans were stunned, but immediately told the general transportation was waiting to take his family to the airport. U.S. troops already were on the ground there and his rule of Haiti was over.

According to Madame X, who said she was present when the Cedras family left their home for the last time, said it was around 11:30 p.m. From the house’s position high up on the mountain above Port-au-Prince, she watched the lights of a plane fully loaded with the junta member’s fly out of Duvalier Airport.

On March 3, 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the House Subcommittee on State department Appropriations about his role in the negotiations with Cedras.

Earlier I wrote one of my primary judgments about people is whether or not they have a sense of humor, and I quickly found Gen. Cedras did. While I had not seen the House hearing transcript until months after I wrote about the Cedras humor, one Powell anecdote in his testimony certainly confirms it. The committee is chaired by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA).

Here it is:

WOLF: Mr. Kirk? (Mark Kirk, R-IL, a member of the subcommittee)

KIRK: Mr. Secretary, where were you on September 18th, 1994?

POWELL: (inaudible)

KIRK: You were actually. . .

POWELL: I know where I was.

KIRK: Yes.

POWELL: I was in Port-au-Prince.

KIRK:You were. My boss was on the phone with you. He was the duty captain in the Navy command center. It was about 11 o'clock at night. Shield teams had already surrounded you and there were a lot of bull's eyes on you and General Cedras (ph). We ordered you to leave, if you remember. I think the conversation went something like, "Sir"—you were a civilian at that point—"Sir, you have to leave right now." with a very authoritative (inaudible) Navy 06 who did that. And you said, "I'm not leaving." And we had already given the go-order to the teams to blow the place to smithereens to take out General Cedras (ph). And it was with considerable personal bravery on your part that you overrode the plan. Can you talk something about that evening? You talked about running around in a truck with a bunch of grenades.

POWELL: It was perhaps one of the most interesting days and evenings of my life, humorous in retrospect. These things always tend to be humorous in retrospect when they are terrifying when occurring. But we were in the presidential palace—or rather the government offices across from the presidential palace—working with General Cedras (ph), who WAS the head of the coup government, and General Biamby (ph) and several other Haitian generals. And the general from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was with us and supporting us in the negotiations, he pulled me aside and he said to me at one point, "We're in the window." I said, "We're in the window? What window?" Because I thought we had another day or two before President Clinton had ordered the operation, only to discover, he said, "No, it's not another day or two. Planes will be taking off in a few hours and they're coming here."

POWELL: I then notified my two colleagues, President Carter and Senator Sam Nunn, that the negotiations had to be speeded up considerably. And we did. And in one of the most fascinating conversations I've ever had, I looked across the table at General Cedras (ph) and I told him, "We're entering at a time we've got to bring this to a conclusion and you've got to go."

And myself, President Carter and Senator Nunn in the room with the Haitian generals and one or two other Americans taking notes, and with guns laying in various corners, and I kept eyeing the closest M- 16 to see if I could beat General Cedras and General Biamby to it if the time came.

And I started to explain to them what was coming and made sure the force that was being assembled and might be dispatched at any moment, not telling them that they had already been dispatched and were taking off from Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina.

And when I got to explaining it all to General Cedras (ph) what was coming—President Carter loves to tell this story—General Cedras (ph) looked at me and he said, "All that's coming, huh?" I said, "Yep." And he said, "We used to be the weakest military force in the hemisphere, and we're now about to become the biggest military force in the hemisphere when all that arrives." It broke the tension and it made it clear to them that it was time to go. And so they said, "Fine, but we can't go. We have to go see the president," who was just a caretaker gentleman, a distinguished old gentleman. And we only had about 20 or 30 minutes left and we raced out of the building to go to the presidential palace. President Carter ran out the front door with his Secret Service agents, and Senator Nunn was right behind him, but I got delayed. So I went down the back steps with the generals, the Haitian generals, and we jumped in the back of a Suburban.

By now, I was all alone, no other Americans with me, and General Cedras (ph) and General Biamby (ph) and a few other people with guns and ammunition and hand grenades rolling all over the floor of the jeep or whatever it was.

POWELL: And we took off. And it was my fondest hope that we were planning to catch up with President Carter over at the presidential palace—which we did. We went in and had a fascinating conversation with the president. And the generals needed somebody to tell them to cut the deal and leave. And that individual at that time, just as a caretaker president said, "I'm the president. Do it." the generals accepted the order with a little bit of resistance. I had to say another few words to them. And President Carter and Senator Nunn and I raced out, got in our car so that we could call President Clinton and let him know that it was not necessary to invade, they could land safely the next morning, and hope that would be the case, and it was the case.

KIRK: I was on the other end. We made hundreds of calls because we had already told units, "Take out your target," and you called us back. But it's ironic that the three decades in service and uniform, you had retired, and you did this as a private citizen. You risked your life to bring democracy back to Haiti. You risked your life to bring Aristide back to power. Do you sense the irony and blasting you now on this point?

POWELL: Of course. President Aristide was elected in 1990 and was forced out of office. We support democracy. We knew at that time, 1991–92, while we were still in office, President Bush, that President Aristide was not a perfect individual. He was flawed. There were aspects to his behavior, there were aspects to his performance and his ability that caused us deep concern. But we recognized him. And he lived in Washington during his periods of exile. And when the new administration came in, the administration, President Clinton and his team tried to find a solution to it, it was called the Governor's Island Agreement with General Cedras (ph) and President Aristide, but it fell apart. And I was out in private life when the situation got worse, and President Clinton decided that he had to do something about it.

POWELL: But I'll never forget on that September weekend, President Clinton decided that he should try one last time to see if it could be done peacefully. He had to go in. The military was going in. He had made that decision. I didn't necessarily agree with it at the time, but he had made the decision. And he called President Carter and asked if he would do it. And then President Clinton called Senator Nunn, and then President Clinton called me after I talked to President Carter and said, if he wanted me to do it I would. And so I did it. It was on a Friday night when we decided to go.

KIRK: We thank you for that.

End of the testimony.

Gen. Powell’s life in danger?

This is a rather dramatic recalling by Gen. Powell of one phase of the negotiations with Gen. Cedras and other Haitian officials.

Except for one detail.

I have great respect for Gen. Powell and his long and outstanding service to his country in the Army and as Secretary of State. But his testimony before the subcommittee is puzzling. I simply do not understand how he could have so badly judged the negotiation situation, to think Cedras or anyone else in that room would have grabbed a weapon to harm members of the U.

Moreover, I have confirmed that Gen. Cedras had absolutely no intention of using Haitian military to in any way to oppose U.S. forces during an invasion of Haiti.

Cedras, still in exile in Panama, is refusing to give interviews until after his own story is published in a book. But if and when his book is published, I believe it will verify his intentions. I also am quite certain there will be no mention in my involvement from December, 1993 to September, 1994.

Aristide returned to Haiti to resume power on Oct. 19, 1994. Years later with Haiti again in political turmoil Aristide, with the blessings of our government, once again was flown to safety outside of Haiti as a small group leading a revolution was ready to storm the presidential palace.

So, in the end the departure of Cedras, his top military leaders and the civilian thugs supporting his coup was exactly by the plan I had proposed to the general (and his wife) during my first trip on this mission.

First, former President Carter, my primary choice as a high-level negotiator with Cedras, actually became involved at the request of the general.

Second, Cedras finally honored his commitment in the Governor’s Island Agreement and left Haiti under the amnesty part in that document.

Third, the Cedras family did no doubt receive some financial incentive for its future in exile. Reliable sources have told me the U.S. government agreed to rent his home in Petitionville, his beach house and one owned by Yanick’s mother. For anyone who cares, the Cedras house was much smaller and considerably more modest than ones I had seen rented there by low-level U.S. embassy staff.

Other end notes.

On the first reading of the Carter Center’s Web site description of the former president’s conflict resolution in Haiti, it’s really amusing to think about Carter, Nunn and Powell running around Port-au-Prince negotiating with other Haitian officials besides Cedras.

Among those listed by the Carter Center as being involved in the negotiations are Brig. Gen. Phillips Biamby and President Emile Jonassaint. Exactly what role Col. Michel Francois, the powerful Port-au-Prince police chief, had in these negotiations is not mentioned on the Center’s Web site.

However, a March 8, 1997 New York Times story reported that a Joseph Michel Francois, former Port-au-Prince police chief, had been indicted in Miami on charges he had helped smuggle 66,000 pounds of Columbian cocaine and heroin into the U.S.

Haitians at that time were not so ignorant of world affairs they did not know of the U.S. military might once President Clinton unleashed it for an invasion there. And many Haitians are much aware of the long history of U.S. troops invading their country.

But I think Clinton was determined the crisis be resolved without bloodshed. And likely the Carter delegation was striving for the same goal. Otherwise, when Carter learned our troops were airborne and on their way to Haiti, he had no reason for wasting his time talking to the junta members.

As for possible bloodshed, if Carter had never gone to meet with Cedras I doubt anyone would have been wounded or killed. Cedras, as a man trained by the U.S. military, understood wasting his Army troops against the vast American forces would be sheer idiocy. And Gen. Cedras did not strike me as an idiot.

Madame X, who called to get me involved in the Haitian crisis, still after a dozen years remains a valued friend and in the winter of 2007 was my guest for a week trying to talk me into assisting her in building a cancer clinic in Haiti where, she says, there is not a single oncologist.

While we totally failed in all our efforts to bring about a "regime change" in Haiti, we can be content with the satisfaction of having played a not so small role in the continued feeding by the relief groups of the estimated 650,000 poor Haitiansa week as  mentioned by President Clinton in his statement and a similar number by the CARE executive.

I know Gerard Latortue, the former prime minister, who eventually was put into power with U.S. backing after Aristide’s latest departure from Haiti. He is a retired UN official who was living peacefully in Florida when asked to try to run a Haitian government in shambles.

But, it’s apparently nothing but business as usual down there. When Hurricane Jeanne hit Haiti in September, 2004 one of the TV networks reported CARE and other charities were on the scene—but no one from the Government of Haiti.You might say it was Latortue’s "Katrina." I find that unforgivable. He is from Gonaives where the hurricane did the most damage, and when he finally went there he was stoned by the city’s residents.

On one of my trips to Haiti to negotiate with Cedras, I was introduced to a young female lawyer named Mireille (pronounced me-ray) Bertin.

Mireille was not so much pro-Cedras as she was anti-Aristide. And she was very vocal in her beliefs.

I was quite fond of Mireille, and was welcomed to her home where I met her husband, a private pilot, and their young children.

Soon after Aristide returned to power, Mireille was assassinated while driving in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince.

It’s difficult to put her death in perspective, considering the thousands of other Haitians who died in that period of time.

Is there really a difference between a person being assassinated by political enemies and those starved to death because of political decisions?

I can’t really answer that question. But I can say, however, that when it is a death of someone I know and admire the pain in my heart is much, much deeper.

Finally, for any who might read my recollection, if I heard this tale from someone in the public sector, relatively unknown, with no background in diplomacy, I frankly would not believe them.

What after all these years seems so amazing was that Gen. Cedras, and most importantly his wife, immediately accepted me as someone who might be of help in a crazy, crazy situation.

I have no plans to visit Panama. But if I ever do, I hope I will have the opportunity to sit down with the general and Madame Cedras over a drink and perhaps find the answer to that question. Otherwise, since no one else can really tell me, I will never know.

POSTSCRIPT: This story has been written over a period of more than two years along with major back surgery, publishing a collection of my newspaper columns and features, continuing my production of video interviews with famous climbers and remodeling a 2400 square feet home. The research has involved countless hours as I strived for accuracy in telling a story that began a dozen years ago without, as I have said, my diaries for 1993 and 1994 when these events were taking place. But it was never intended as an historic document, just another tale of my continual tilting at windmills.

Also, I have made little effort to insert or list the dozens of Web sites I have visited during this project. They are many, but few reflecting what in my opinion is a real understanding of Haiti and its people.

I did go back to Haiti on vacation once more after Aristide was returned to power. By the second day, hairs were rising on the back of my neck and my instincts were telling me my life was in danger. Perhaps it was just the thoughts about what had happened to Mirielle. In addition, there were Haitians still around who knew of my relationship with Cedras and might have perceived me as someone trying to keep him in power. I’m sure my life was not in danger, but I packed up and flew back to DC anyway. And if someone down there has been sticking pins in a John Meek voodoo doll, perhaps that accounts for my aching back.