The spring sun was blasting through the big casement window on the east
side of my office, lighting the room and warming my back as I sat with my
computer keyboord across my legs with the monitor in front of me on a
chrome and teak wood stand.
After writing the salutation, I struggled with how I would compose a few
paragraphs that would be the most important words I had ever written in my
life. Words more important than those in one speech I had written for
President Kennedy and, later, others I wrote for President Johnson, Vice
President Humphrey, members of Congress and corporate titans.
What I had learned through many years of experience was that once any
communication crosses the border from one country to another everything is
different. Words that may be as common as sliced bread to us in this
country may be alien or worse, misunderstood by the recipient or
recipients in another country.
In international dealings one learns such cautions that the Japanese like
their space so no mano a mano hugs, the French think their language is the
only one on earth and the British speak beautifully and can mesmerize
listeners but more often than not it’s just talk and nothing more.
The memo I was trying to compose was to a lesser developed country or LDC,
an acronym of the eighties and nineties. It’s major language was French.
Finally I found some words to write the brief memo and went into another
room where the printer for my company was located. Along with a cover
sheet, I inserted it into the fax machine and dialed the international
code for the country and then the number of a residence there.
After the pages had moved through the sending process, I took the two
sheets and tore them into tiny bits of paper. Then, moving through the
office suite I dropped some of the paper bits into several wastebaskets.
Back at my computer I deleted the memo and cover sheet from the hard
drive, not ignorant of the fact that anything that ever goes on a hard
drive can be recovered with special equipment and software. But I did not
expect the FBI would try that if I came under suspicion as an unregistered
foreign agent.
Now, all I could do was wait a few days to see if those few words I had
composed that morning would make a difference. One way or the other, I
would know and if they did not do the job then at least I had the
satisfaction that I had tried my best. This was the philosophy I had used
throughout my career – do your best and then sleep well at night. By and
large, it had proved to be the right way.
During my long and interesting career in Washington, DC, my work in the
private sector received a reasonable amount of media coverage – mostly
national or international.
Neither my staff nor I generated this publicity by promoting ourselves
using the same public relations skills we provided to our clients. It came
about because we were involved with issues that were news. They included
lifting the arms embargo against the Government of Turkey, our NATO
partner; saving seatbelts in all vehicles sold in this country and getting
U.S. landing rights for the British-French Concorde SST.
Perhaps the pinnacle of my Andy Warhol 15 minutes of fame was when I was
the only public relations executive among thousands in our nation’s
capital included in Time Magazine’s Aug. 7,1978 cover story on lobbying in
Washington.
My work while heading the Washington, DC office of a major international
public relations firm was publicized in newspapers and other magazine
articles, books and television programs.
But one project, costing me a great deal of personal time and money, never
received any publicity and only a handful of people have known of my
involvement in this strange mission.
It was an ill-fated effort to get Gen. Raoul Cedras, who had overthrown
democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide of Haiti, to keep
his word by packing his bags and leaving the little Caribbean island --
the poorest and most heavily populated country in the Western Hemisphere.
This is how it happened.
The phone rang and I was surprised, wondering who would be calling so
early. It was no one from Glaxo or anyone working for me back in DC. The
voice had a French accent and a slight stutter as the caller struggled to
find the correct English pronunciation of her words.
Her message was that I must come to Haiti immediately to try to resolve
the standoff between the United Nations/Clinton Administration and Gen.
Cedras. The embargo imposed by the United Nations, she said, was slowly
destroying a little country that had so little even in the best of
circumstances.
I
knew a general had overthrown Aristide, who had been allowed to leave
Haiti unharmed and was encamped in the U.S. Vaguely, I remembered there
had been a meeting arranged on Governor’s Island, where Aristide met
briefly with Cedras as they signed an accord wherein the general would
leave at some point and Aristide would return to power in Port-au-Prince –
the Haitian capital.
Being in a hurry to get dressed, eat breakfast and show up for the
seminar, I explained to the caller that I was clueless on events happening
in Haiti and certainly in no position to get involved in some far-fetched
and complicated situation.
I did know about the embargo placed on Haiti, and news reports about
thousands of deaths because of the shortage of virtually everything needed
for survival unless you were one of the country’s elite.
So I said goodbye to the caller and hung up.
That was Friday, Dec. 4, 1993. By Monday I was back in my office, a
stone’s throw from the White House, when the woman in Haiti called a
second time.
Once more I tried to dissuade her from thinking I possibly could be of any
help. And besides, of all people, why me?
“You may not know it,” she said, “but you are highly regarded and trusted
by many people in Haiti. You are the only person we know who might be able
to help and solve this horrible situation caused by the embargo. Please
come to Haiti. We need you.”
I was flattered by her comments but again told her I was not up to date on
the Haitian situation, and could not imagine being in the position to
help.
Later that week I mentioned the two calls to a close friend. To my
amazement I was told that Michael Kozak, the U.S. Dept. of State official
in charge of negotiating with Cedras to leave Haiti, was a neighbor.
On Sunday evening, I gave up my coveted tickets to the Kennedy Center
Honors gala to visiting relatives and went to my friend’s home to have a
drink with Kozak and discuss the situation.
Kozak is a career State department officer and as of this writing (August
2005) is the acting assistant secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bios/k/38603.htm.
Prior to being assigned to work on the Haiti crisis, Kozak was in charge
of negotiations to persuade Gen. Noriega, the Panamanian military
dictator, to leave his country so democracy could be restored. His efforts
on that assignment ended with a U.S. military invasion of Panama on Dec.
20, 1989, ordered by President George H. W. Bush. Noriega was captured and
brought to Miami for a trial that led to imprisonment.
Kozak clearly was surprised I had been asked to get involved in Haiti.
But, he admitted he had not been directly in touch with Gen. Cedras for
months. Without making any commitment on the part of the State department,
he said some contact with Cedras to see what he was thinking could be very
helpful.
Kozak was not clutching at straws. However, the humanitarian situation had
become so dramatic it seemed any movement on what had become a Clinton-Cedras
standoff could not be discounted.
So, overnight I became the self-appointed, de facto, secret negotiator
between the State department and the military dictator of Haiti.
The next day I made a reservation with American Airlines to fly to
Port-au-Prince. When my flight landed in Haiti I was met at the airport by
a former government official I knew and the woman who had been phoning me.
I will refer to her as Madame X.
My hotel in Haiti was the El Rancho, high up on the mountain above
Port-au-Prince in Petitionville – the area mainly occupied by Haiti’s
elite.
Since I had more than once confessed on the phone to my ignorance of the
current developments in the Haitian standoff Madame X, with Gen. Cedras’
blessing, had arranged a series of meetings the next day at the hotel when
I would be updated on the crisis.
It was a long day, including lunch and several hours spent with a former
Haitian ambassador to the U.S., who had retired as foreign minister.
Madame X also had arranged for me to have dinner with Gen. Cedras and his
wife, Yanick, on my second evening in Haiti at their home in Petitionville.
That night, alone, I was driven to the general’s residence. It was a very
modest house surrounded by a wall topped with barbed wire and guarded by
young soldiers from the Haitian army.
It reminded me of my previous experience with the West African Government
of Liberia. Sometimes it appeared as if two or three guys with BB guns
could easily have overthrown the ruling government. When Liberia’s coup
led by Sgt. Doe did come, it was one of the bloodiest ever on that
continent.
The three of us – Cedras, his wife and myself -- had cocktails in the
living room, then moved out to a large balcony where a table had been set
for dinner. In the French tradition, Cedras spoke only in that language
and his wife did the translation. Cedras, I later learned, was a career
military officer and had been trained in the U.S. Obviously he understood
every word I said. But, having had several French clients in my career, I
was accustomed to the language ploy so any misunderstanding could be
blamed on the translator.
From the time we shook hands when I arrived at the Cedras home, it was
clear that in a strange way he, his wife and I had an immediate rapport
with each other. You get that through body language, not from the usual
cordial expressions such as, “I am pleased to meet you.”
In Petitonville above the masses of people, vehicle exhausts and humidity
of Port-au-Prince, it is cool and dry. While a servant poured wine, we ate
then sat and talked for hours. Normally translation of a language
different from English drives me up the wall, but on that evening it
bothered me not one bit. Finally, long after midnight I was driven back to
the El Rancho.
The next day, as Gen. Cedras and I agreed, I would draft a plan for his
consideration that would end the stalemate with President Aristide and the
Clinton Administration. But most of all it would end the devastating
consequences of the embargo.
Sitting by the El Rancho pool with a yellow pad and pen, I drew up a plan
that would allow Cedras to leave with honor and Aristide to return as the
head of state of Haiti. Using the hotel copying machine, my yellow pad
notes were duplicated and taken by a messenger to the general that night.
My plan was simple but comprehensive, and went into considerable detail on
how the transition of power could come about with Cedras leaving but not
in disgrace.
The next day nothing was happening, and I packed to fly back to
Washington. That night I received a phone call from Madame X saying Gen.
Cedras generally was favorable to my plan. But Yanick Cedras had gone
postal over the idea of Jimmy Carter being involved, because he had been a
monitor for the election when Aristide won the presidency.
So far as I know, there was no reaction to Walters. Frankly, I don’t think
in the Cedras household they were knowledgeable about Walters and his
incredible background in the military and diplomacy.
I did not have to be a seasoned diplomat to understand
Madame Cedras was a major player in this game. Yanick hated Aristide and
it was obvious she would rather turn Haiti over to anyone other than the
slum priest turned politician. But at the White House, there would be no
compromise. Aristide had to return as president.
Back in DC I reported on my trip to Kozak, and had a number of calls from
Haiti confirming there was a strong bond of trust between the general and
Madame Cedras and myself. However, not to my surprise there was no
movement by the general to accept any part of my plan for him to honor the
Governor’s Island Accord and get the hell out.
Over the Christmas holidays I was skiing in Colorado with Gordon and Tish
Imrie, my British friends from Marbella, Spain, when I received another
very early morning phone call from Madame X.
She reported Yanick Cedras had indicated to her they were ready to accept
some version of my plan for his departure, and I needed to come back to
Haiti immediately to work out the details. She said Yanick was looking
forward to my next visit.
Gordon Imrie is a graduate of the UK’s Sandhurst military academy, the
equivalent of our West Point, and has served with the intelligence branch
of the British Army in Saudi Arabia. Among his other military assignments,
he had been wounded while serving on Cypress and at one point was an
escort for Princess Margaret.
My friend thought my leaving the ski vacation to make another trip back
to Haiti was, although he put it more diplomatically, really dumb. It was
easy to understand his view of my being a part of solving what had become
a major pain in the ass for Bill Clinton -- because of pressure from the
civil rights groups and Haitian boat people trying to make it to Florida.
I
didn’t disagree with Gordo. In no way did I see myself as a nominee for
the Nobel Peace Prize or being otherwise recognized for any success. For
me it was simply a labor of love for two countries that had no business
whatever being in such an untenable situation. And since Kozak was having
no other communication with Gen. Cedras, at least I had solved that
problem.
Naïve or not, the next day I drove down to the Denver airport and left for
Washington. The morning after I was home, I repacked from thermal
underwear and down jackets to summer clothes and left for Port-au-Prince.
At my hotel, I was told there were two obstacles standing in the way of
Cedras leaving.
First Yanick, the longtime mate of a career Army officer, was immensely
enjoying the power that had come with the coup. Second, there was a group
of thugs who were carrying out the dirty work of keeping the general in
power, and they also were enjoying the spoils of victors.
But Haiti was hurting and the upper class also was being dinged. The
prices of gasoline and other essentials were out of sight and it was not
easy to survive in business because of the UN’s stifling embargo. However,
neither the UN nor the U.S. government ever found a way to stop embargoed
goods coming into Haiti over the border from the Dominican Republic.
On this trip I was invited to lunch at the Cedras home on New Year’s Eve,
with Madame X also a guest, for more discussion of an exit plan. Before I
left for my hotel in the afternoon, Yanick invited me to join them that
evening to celebrate the coming of the New Year at an exclusive club in
Petitonville. They would send a car to pick me up.
That evening, the driver came to my hotel not to pick me up but to offer
apologies from the general and Madame Cedras. There was a change in their
plans for welcoming in the New Year, and they did not include me.
Later I was told one of Gen. Cedras’ advisors, probably one of his
brothers, felt my presence at the party might cause problems.
With other New Year’s Eve celebrants at the club, questions would be
raised about what this American was doing in their midst. The inevitable,
but laughable to me, explanation in their minds would be that I was a CIA
agent and Cedras was considering a new deal to leave and turn the country
back to Aristide..
Madame X, who had called to urge me to come back to Haiti, unfortunately
had been misled about the thinking in the general’s household. Mainly it
was Yanick’s thinking more than that of her husband, though he was
beholden to the other high military officers and the rag-tag civilian gang
that had helped overthrow Aristide.
So my friend Gordo had been right, and I took a flight home.
From some computer notes I made after returning to Washington:
“Driving to a meeting at Kozak’s house on Saturday afternoon, Jan. 8, 1994
through the Virginia suburbs with snow in the yards, thinking about the
irony of us being out there trying to save a country not that far away
where people were lying around their swimming pools.
“My feelings against getting involved until at the end of our first
meeting when Kozak seemed to be encouraging me to do it. What must he have
thought about me having any chance of success?
“Peter Paul, who had driven me around Haiti many times in his taxi,
grabbing me at the Port-au-Prince airport as I was leaving on Jan. 2. And
learning that Herrod, a young Haitian who had driven my son, James, and me
the one time I rented a car in Haiti, was dead – probably of AIDS.”
In the meantime, Kozak most likely was getting no better information on
Cedras from the American embassy’s CIA staff in Haiti than what I reported
to him any time there was a new development.
After New Year’s, I received a call from Madame X saying she was being
dispatched by Gen. Cedras with two other Haitians to come to Washington
for an on-the-scene evaluation of his situation.
I
set up meetings with key House staff members for the little group. Then I
arranged for another event.
My religious affiliation in Washington was at the Metropolitan Memorial
United Methodist Church, which bills itself as the national
Methodist Church of the USA.
The minister was the Rev. Dr. Bill Holmes, a man of my own age who every
Sunday had the opportunity to give his liberal views to some of
Washington’s powerful worshipers. Phil Jones, the veteran CBS
correspondent, often passed the plate for our offerings and Chuck Manatt,
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, usually sat in front of me
at the rear of the nave.
I
asked Bill to set up a meeting where the little delegation could air its
views on the desperate situation in their country. My hope was Bill might
be inspired to motivate the congregation to persuade President Clinton
that the results of the embargo were killing Haitians, and not seriously
bothering the upper class.
Bill wanted to invite retired Bishop James K. Matthews, who had
considerable experience as a missionary in Africa.
Also attending the meeting, at my invitation, was David King, former
congressman, ambassador and a high official of the new Mormon Temple in
the Maryland suburbs.
David and I met after he was elected to the House from Salt Lake and I was
part of President Johnson’s congressional relations team trying to get his
Great Society program enacted into law.
In 1966 David lost his seat largely due to his stand on Right-to-Work
legislation. Having been a strong supporter of the president’s Great
Society legislation, I recommended to the White House that he be given a
job in the Johnson Administration. So, he was chosen for a dual
ambassadorship to Mauritius and the Malagasy Republic.
This is an obvious digression, but an incident that happened several years
earlier I think is worth a sidebar story here.
In 1988 at the age of 68, David was asked to go to Haiti as president of
the Port-au-Prince Mission, supervising 125 missionaries for the Latter
Day Saints Church. Soon afterward I went down there on vacation.
There is a feeling in many of us that when we like two people, if
we somehow get them together they will like each other. Of course it
doesn’t always work, but there’s a bit of hubris if it does.
So one day while in Haiti I invited David and a friend, who had served in
Haiti’s foreign ministry, to join me for lunch at a Petitionville
restaurant.
After we had been seated my foreign ministry friend said to David, “You
know, Mr. Ambassador, I am a student of Haitian history and the name King
is very important in the background of our country.”
David and I nodded.
“When Haiti was occupied by the American Marines from 1915 to 1934,” my
friend continued, “there was a a Senator King in your country who led the
effort in Congress to give us back our freedom.”
My friend paused.
“Yes,” said David, “I understand. Senator King was my father, and the
first time I visited Haiti was when as a young child I accompanied my
parents here so your government could present him with a special honor.”
http://www.haiti.org/general_information/keyhisdates.htm
The meeting at the church was cordial but accomplished nothing.
I
very much wanted to take Bill Holmes and Bishop Mathews to Haiti to see
firsthand the terrible effects of the embargo on those outside the ruling
class, which was its intended target.
My thinking was that perhaps after such a trip they could hold a news
conference with other clergy, and make an appeal to President Clinton to
end the embargo and save thousands of lives. In addition I could have
arranged for them to meet with Gen. Cedras to express their concerns about
the damage being done by his bringing on the embargo.
My problem was I had a business to run and the immediate need to begin
shooting a video with Walter Cronkite from Arizona to New York City. So
the little group with Madame X returned to Haiti with little accomplished.
However, when I met them for dinner at their hotel the night before they
were to leave, I told them word had been passed to me that they should
delay their flight to Port-au-Prince because of “security” reasons.
Time moved along with no progress in dislodging the junta. Then in
February, through a call from Kozak, I became aware of a developing crisis
that potentially would put Cedras in an even more unfavorable public
relations situation – if that were possible.
CARE, the Catholic Service Organization and other charitable groups had
been providing food and some health assistance for almost a million
Haitians who otherwise would have starved as a result of the embargo.
These organizations had food, but the fuel supply for the vehicles taking
it throughout the country was depleted.
A
tanker loaded with gasoline, Kozak said, was on the way to Port-au-Prince
and could supply needed fuel to the relief groups.
However, a tanker taking fuel to Haiti for charitable purposes – permitted
under the UN embargo rules -- was nothing new. The problem was when the
ships docked, the thugs operating under the Cedras government were
confiscating the gasoline and selling it on the black market. If it
happened again, the hundreds of thousands of Haitians depending on CARE
and others for food and medical supplies would be at risk.
Cedras now was depending on me for some of his public relations advice,
another indication of the trust that had developed between us. It seemed
to me the general, as a professional soldier, did not want to be portrayed
in America as a ruthless dictator but someone who was saving his country
from an incompetent leader.
The fax machine the general used was in his home, not at his office where
his staff might see our communications. So I sent him an urgent fax
explaining the enormous amount of negative publicity he would receive in
the U.S. if his people confiscated the gasoline from the tanker that soon
would be docking in Port-au-Prince.
A
response came back. He gave me his word the fuel would go to the relief
organizations, and it did. Sometime in the next few days Kozak called to
thank me for my efforts.
Another similar situation arose a few months later.
When I returned home from dinner one evening around midnight, there was an
urgent phone message from a friend in Oklahoma City who was public
relations director for Larry Jones and his Feed the Children organization.
I
returned her call, and she told me The Feed the Children warehouse in
Port-au-Prince (later confirmed by footage on one of the organization’s
television programs) was completely empty. But Feed the Children had a
chartered Boeing 707 at the Miami airport loaded with supplies ready to
fly to Haiti.
The problem, my friend said, was that Cedras’ people would not let the
plane land at the Duvalier Airport in Port-au-Prince. I asked why Cedras
would stop the Feed the Children plane since the organization had been
operating freely in Haiti where Larry Jones, an Oklahoma minister, had
founded it.
She said a few days earlier Jones had flown to Haiti with Rep. Charles
Rangel (D-NY) and his House of Representatives associate, Ben Gilman
(R-NY), who were leading the effort in Congress to rid Haiti of Cedras and
restore Aristide to power. The Cedras people were retaliating for Jones’
associating with the two congressmen.
Midnight is never late in Haiti, so I called the Cedras home to make yet
another plea that the Feed the Children plane be given landing rights. One
of the general’s brothers, whom I had not met, answered the phone and said
the general and his sister-in-law were out for dinner. He confirmed that
Gen. Cedras was angry over the Jones trip to Haiti with Rangel and Gilman,
and Feed the Children was no longer welcome down there.
Unlike Gen. Cedras, the brother spoke to me in excellent English. I told
him I agreed Jones might have made an unintended political mistake by
going to Haiti with the congressmen, but it was a much larger error in
judgment on his brother’s part to deprive starving people of the supplies
Feed the People was providing.
The Feed the Children cargo plane literally was on the runway at the Miami
airport. As some point, I was told, the pilot received word his aircraft
with the desperately needed supplies had been cleared to land at the
Haitian airport.
My friend said Jones would be calling to thank me for my help, but he
never did. Perhaps he thought that because I had been able to reverse the
decision to keep Feed the Children out of Haiti, I had become part of the
Cedras crowd.
I
wanted to talk to Jones, not to receive his thanks which in a way would
have been a meaningless gesture considering the recipients of that plane
load of food and other essentials. Since Feed the Children had been
founded in Haiti, I was eager to learn more about how it was started and
Jones’ goals for the organization short and long term.
But helping on these two relief efforts was not a permanent fix for the
problem of the charitable organizations with their food distribution
program.
A
New York Times story datelined Aug. 22, 1994 from Port-au-Prince said more
than 500,000 gallons of diesel fuel and gasoline had been stored there by
the Haitian government since shipments began arriving that year, while
relief organizations were using up the last of their supplies.
One source for the Times story was Ross Mountain, relief coordinator in
Haiti for the United Nations.
“The fuel program is the essential part of the total operation,” Mr.
Mountain said. “It is vital to the provision of water in and outside
Port-au-Prince, the transportation of food, the function of hospitals, the
transportation of medical supplies, and essential to the lives of
millions of Haitians.” (italics not mine)
According to the story, the 500,000 gallons in the clutches of the
government would have carried the relief groups through September and
October.
The story continues:
“Without that fuel,” the Times reported, “millions of Haiti’s poor in the
countryside will almost certainly endure more hardship because they depend
on food provided by aid groups. People who depend on hospitals and
medicines in the cities and all over Haiti will suffer and die, say relief
workers who did not want to be identified for fear of angering the Haitian
Government.”
For the purposes of this narrative, it is important that somewhere in here
there must be a caveat that I should hedge on the precise dates of some of
these events.
Prior to moving to Arizona from Washington late in 1999, I already had
misplaced – apparently in an office move in 1996 -- my diary for 1993. In
the move to Arizona, my 1994 diary was misplaced. But the notation made in
my office computer is that I was working on the Feed the Children problem
on July 5, 1994. A note to the Rev. Dr. Bill Holmes thanking him for
setting up the meeting, and mentioning the tanker problem, is dated Feb.
27, 1994.
Reading several drafts of this document in the summer of 2005, Madame X
proved helpful in filling in some of the gaps in my memory about
situations I overlooked.
In searching through hundreds of videotapes in my collection, I found two
that had interviews with Cedras.
One is an ABC Evening News segment where the late Peter Jennings went to
Haiti to do an on-the-scene report. Unfortunately, the tag with the date
is missing but I’m guessing it was in the spring of 1994.
Early on in his report, Jennings says Air France was ending its flights to
Haiti at the end of the month, and that there were no other flights to
Haiti.
Jennings also refers to a Cedras statement suggesting a U.S. invasion of
Haiti would be met with some resistance, but points out quite accurately
that Cedras hadn’t much of an army to present any threat to our forces.
Cedras also was interviewed by Jennings. In this discussion, it was
mentioned that Congress might appoint a commission to negotiate with the
junta. Cedras said, in French, if that happened he would be available to
meet with the commission.
Around the first of May, 1994, through a trusted friend in the media, only
one of two or three people who knew of my “mission impossible” in Haiti, I
was approached by an NBC “Meet the Press” producer to ask Gen. Cedras to
appear on the program.
Cedras agreed, and on May 5, Mothers Day, he appeared on “Meet the Press”
and was questioned by host Tim Russert and David Broder of The Washington
Post.
Inasmuch as one of the services offered by my firm, HMI, Inc.
Communications was a seminar on “meeting the media,” I was asked by Madame
X to send Cedras a memo about various aspects of this important
appearance.
First, I recommended that he speak in English. But in the entire interview
only one of his sentences was not in French.
In other recommendations I suggested he chose an attractive background,
wear a dark suit, blue shirt and a solid-color tie to enhance his sallow
features.
All my advice was ignored. For the interview he sat in front of a wood
paneled wall, probably in the Army headquarters. His clothing looked as if
it had come from a bargain basement sale.
Responding to the Russert and Broder questions, his thin lips hardly moved
as he spoke in a barely audible voice.
Looking back on this program from the perspective of some 11 years, the
best description that comes to me is “quaint.”
The translation from French to English and back to French on such a long
interview was terrible. When we watch the news and see an Iraqi on TV in a
sound bite talking about a bombing he’s witnessed, translation is
necessary and okay for a few seconds. But on the long “Meet the Press”
interview with Russert and Broder it was deadly.
The program began with an interview with Randall Robinson, at that time
executive director of TransAfrica, then in his 27th day of a
fast protesting the treatment of Haitian refugees fleeing their country
for the U.S.
Robinson said he had just received a call from Anthony Lake, President
Clinton’s national security advisor, saying the administration had changed
its policy and would be granting asylum in the U.S. for the Haitian
refugees. Therefore he was ending his hunger strike, and said the change
in U.S. policy would save hundreds or thousands of lives.
Robinson was followed by Cedras and the tedious translations from English
to French and vice versa.
A key issue at the time was what to do with the Haitian refugees trying to
make it to Florida by boats. When they were picked up at sea by Navy or
Coast Guard vessels, the big question was who among the Haitians were
political refugees whose lives were in danger and which ones were just
seeking, as Cedras said at one point, “the American Dream.”
To segue from the “Meet the Press” interview for a moment, it is beyond my
comprehension that any Navy or Coast Guard crewmember could honestly make
such a judgment – even if a Haitian refugee spoke English or someone among
our naval crews spoke French. In other words, what possible evidence could
any Haitian at sea produce indicating his or her life was threatened by
the junta thugs?
These criteria were never discussed on the program and I have no idea how
a decision would be made about who went back to Haiti and who would be
granted asylum in this country because whoever rules in Haiti does not
publish a hit list. Going back decades, Haitians have just been killed
because someone had the power to do it without fear of reprisal as Stalin
is alleged to have killed millions of his own people in the Soviet Union
because he could.
Back to “Meet the Press.”
Cedras pretty much stayed on message in suggesting “dialogue” was the way
to solve the crisis, and what he meant by that I suppose only he would
know.
Broder weighed in with questions about whether the general would step
aside for amnesty (guaranteed to junta members in the Governor’s Island
Accord) and would he stop Haitian refugees fleeing from their country. He
received no clearer answers than had Russert.
Tim then said that new sanctions were going to be put into place some two
weeks later on May 21 unless the general stepped down
“Will you?”
No straight answer, just more about the need for that elusive “dialogue.”
Russert then said President Clinton would be speaking about Haiti later
that day at a news conference. Was there anything Cedras would like to say
to Clinton?
“I would like to say,” Cedras replied in perfect English, “in the name of
justice to review the situation of Haiti.”
And the interview was over.
Next on the program came Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-IN), chair of the House
Foreign Relations Committee and Rep. Maxine Waters (D-CA), an African
American outspoken on human rights issues.
Russert went right to the jugular with Rep. Waters, asking her if she was
willing to accept Haitian refugees in California.
Throughout her part of the interview, Rep. Waters was as evasive as Cedras.
Her answer to the situation did not waiver. Restore Aristide to power, and
there will be no refugees in Florida or elsewhere.
Rep. Hamilton was asked the same question, and he responded that Indiana
would be willing to take its share of the political refugees while those
who left Haiti for economic reasons should be returned.
Rep. Hamilton, who has long been retired from Congress and has since
served as co-chair of the 9/11 Commission, said he was opposed to using
military force at that time. Within the context of the U.S. invasion of
Iraq, he wisely commented that the problem (of a U.S. invasion of Haiti)
“is how you get them out.”
Both Rep. Waters and Rep. Hamilton agreed Cedras in his comments had been
very vague. Dialogue. What dialogue?
Broder did raise the question of how to tell political from economic
refugees. Rep. Waters responded, “We will be fair.”
Then Broder asked Rep. Hamilton if Congress would support U.S. military
intervention in Haiti.
“Not now,” was the answer. Later, Rep. Hamilton wryly remarked that when
the U.S. now uses military force against another nation (Grenada and
Panama for example), Congress usually is in the position of approving the
action after the fact.
Another noteworthy comment by Rep. Hamilton was the wise observation that
when President Aristide did return to Haiti he would need to broaden his
base, especially with the Haitian Parliament, to build a national
consensus. And he advised President
Clinton to
not use military force against Haiti without congressional approval.
In having just the most basic knowledge and understanding of Haiti is to
personally experience its enormous poverty with the accompanying lack of
decent housing, health care, sanitation, education and the opportunity for
employment.
What was missing from all the discussion on the “Meet the Press” program
that day, which was par for the course with any discourse about Haiti, was
a single word addressing these terrible problems. Absent any president
short of Jesus Christ and the working of miracles, under the massive
poverty situation it hardly mattered who headed Haiti whether it be
Aristide, Cedras or anyone else.
There is a line in an old Kris Kristofferson song, “Me and Bobby Magee,”
lamenting that “freedom is just another word for nothin’ left to lose, and
nothin’ ain’t worth nothin’ but it’s free.” And having freedom for the
people of Haiti really is almost worthless without a serious effort to
address this overwhelming state of poverty among the vast majority of the
Haitian people.
Back in Haiti, I was told, the Cedras crowd reportedly thought it was by
far the general’s best interview at explaining why he reneged on the
Governor’s Island agreement.
From the viewpoint of the American viewers of “Meet the Press,” I think
the interview was disastrous – the general’s somber look, his refusal to
respond directly to questions, the background and his choice of dress.
But, understanding why the interview was perceived as positive is to have
an understanding of Haiti and not measure other countries of the world by
our own system of fitting square and round pegs into square and round
holes.
Down in Port-au-Prince among the elite in their homes in Petitionville,
the general was a success because he had not flinched at the tough
questions by Russert and Broder, he had kept his cool and stayed on the
vague message of “dialogue.”
What we Americans saw on “Meet the Press” was not Gen. Cedras as I came to
know him.
I
have been an advisor to world leaders from Japan to (post Idi Amin) Uganda
and one of my major criteria for measuring such people simply is this:
does he, or she, have a sense of humor?
On my first visit with Cedras I quickly learned he did have a sense of
humor, was actually very personable and seemed to care deeply about his
country. This does not mean, however, that I condoned the coup or his
refusing to honor his part of the Governor’s Island Accord.
To back up a bit from the “Meet the Press” interview, on Feb. 17, 1994, I
faxed a memo to Cedras about a delegation from the Haitian Parliament that
was in the U.S. to try to work out a new agreement between Cedras and
President Aristide.
The delegation was meeting with Aristide that afternoon, according to my
memo, and planned a news conference the next day.
There would be no negotiating and no signing if both Aristide and Cedras
agreed to the proposal from the delegation.
I
faxed the story of the plan to Cedras and in a memo told the general my
government sources had conveyed to me the message that this crisis had to
have closure in the immediate future. I urged him to accept the plan and
announce his decision as soon as possible.
But Aristide rejected the plan. From my view in DC, the junta could have
had a small public relations coup by going along with what the delegation
proposed.
On Feb. 15 a Reuters story reported on a State department briefing on the
plan. The story said: “At the same time, the United States Tuesday
circulated a Security Council resolution that sharply tightens the trade
embargo against Haiti, grounds private aircraft and freezes some financial
assets.
“But the hearts of some senior U.S. officials involved with Haiti policy
are clearly not behind the resolution. One senior official said Monday
Washington did not want to destroy the Haitian economy and society and
make the country ungovernable for Aristide or any other democratic
government.”
In my opinion, the sanctions imposed on Haiti already had accomplished
that and any new embargo restrictions probably would have made little
difference.
During this time I was on the phone with Madame Cedras one day and it
seemed she finally was ready to leave. However, as we talked Yanick
received word the Haitian legislature’s delegation plan had been warmly
received in Washington. Suddenly in a 180-degree turn, Yanick in great
anger reversed herself and we were back to square one.
Knowing I had a straight pipeline to Mike Kozak, Yanick used me like a
yoyo with her calls and erratic behavior. My guess is that Kozak’s
superiors who were briefed on this strange negotiation triangle must have
been laughing themselves silly over what I communicated to Mike. And I
wouldn’t blame them.
But I did have one card up my sleeve the mighty White House, State
department and the CIA could not trump. I was the only one in the U.S. (so
far as I know even today) who had a continuing line of communication
directly to the Cedras household.
Ironically, in September, 1994, as the Haitian crisis was near the top of
the White House agenda, Jimmy Carter came forward offering himself as the
official representative of President Clinton to get Cedras to leave and
Aristide back in power.
How did Carter get involved? Remember earlier I wrote that Yanick Cedras
was livid at the suggestion in my original exit strategy plan that the
Haitians might accept President Jimmy Carter as a high-level negotiator?
Jimmy Carter got into the act because he had received a very important
phone call asking for his help. That call came from Gen. Raoul Cedras.
At this point Clinton was tired of the pressure being exerted by the
human rights groups and the lack of any movement by the State department
in getting Cedras to leave, so he reluctantly accepted Carter as his
negotiator.
I
think reluctantly because Jimmy Carter, perhaps always with all good
intentions, had become somewhat of a loose canon in his international
crisis resolution efforts. And of course it seems just human that a
sitting president does not want his own administration to seem so inept it
has to accept help from a former president even though both are Democrats.
But
Clinton, ever wise in many ways, was not going to turn Carter loose alone
in Port-au-Prince with his sometimes over-the-edge diplomacy. As
insurance, the commander-in-chief sent along an African-American Army
general who happened to be Colin Powell, retired chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff and architect of the quick victory in Operation Desert
Storm.
Filling out this delegation was U.S. Sen. Sam Nunn (D-GA), chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. Nunn had managed in his Washington career
to keep one foot in the conservatism of the South and the other in the
center or edging slightly toward the left on some issues.
Gen. Powell’s trip with Carter and Nunn had an unexpected sidebar. What is
not known, perhaps even to the general himself, is that Yanick Cedras was
not just one of his admirers. During his mission to Haiti, she fell in
love with him.
Nevertheless, love or no love, Yanick still was not prepared to surrender
all that power and leave Haiti for some other country.
In fact, in this time frame Cedras began to plan a new presidential
election with himself as the leading candidate. After a few practice runs
to “campaign” outside Port-au-Prince, the reception was so cold the
election idea soon was shelved. The point is Cedras and his wife were
trying to create any scenario possible so he could continue as Haiti’s
ruler.
Privately, Clinton was ready to send Army paratroopers to take over the
country and rid himself of this crisis. A long-standing pest named Fidel
Castro was problem enough in the Caribbean area.
Carter, Nunn and Powell flew to Haiti and began negotiations with Gen.
Cedras. Viewing one side of his persona, Carter is a somber, strictly
businessperson most of the time. But he also has a charming side when he
sees it will help him achieve the kind of success that earned him a
dark-horse victory in the race against President Ford.
According to the cliffhanger media reports that Sunday night, Carter
refused to leave Haiti not having solved the crisis -- even though U.S.
military aircraft with paratroopers were in the air ready to invade the
little country. Not knowing what might happen, Clinton was urging Carter
to get the hell out lest he be caught up in any dangerous situation.
Dangerous situation? That to me is laughable, but here are some excerpts
from what David Halberstam wrote in his incisive book, “WAR IN A TIME OF
PEACE – BUSH, CLINTON, and the GENERALS.” (Touchstone, 2001)
“By September (1994), the plan was mostly in place. The orders from the
White House were that the invasion was to be kept to a force of under
twenty-two thousand men – actually it would be closer to twenty-five. The
82nd Airborne would be launched from Fort Bragg. Elements of
the 101st Airborne were sitting nearby on a ship ready to join
in, and a force of about two thousand marines would hit the shores. To
complete the assault, the Tenth Mountain Division would come ashore almost
as soon as the airborne troops had landed. Even before the invasion was
set in motion some Special Forces units would go ashore to take out any
Haitian armored vehicles.”
Then this:
“By mid-September they were ready for the invasion. Then things became
complicated. Jimmy Carter, the former president, had valuable contacts in
Haiti including some with members of the junta. He understood that some
form of invasion was about to take place and volunteered to lead a
negotiating team to try to get the junta to leave peacefully. Clinton was
delighted to avoid the outright use of force to remove the junta, but he
was also wary of Carter.”
Later:
“So it was a politically loaded, somewhat risky idea. In the eyes of the
White House, Carter was hard to control, and he tended to freelance and
thereby, they feared, play into the hands of the local bad guys. Still, if
it was not an ideal option, nothing in Haiti was ideal, and one last
effort for peace would be reassuring to other Latin American nations in
showing that we had not wanted to practice gunboat diplomacy. So even as
the invasion countdown was taking place, Clinton decided to send Carter,
Powell and Nunn.”
Many years ago Graham Greene published a major novel called “The
Comedians,” which was a barely fictional account of Haiti during the
brutal reign of Papa Doc Duvalier. If Greene had been alive when this
charade played out at the White House, State department and in Haiti, he
surely would have died again – this time laughing himself to death.
So could other ”old Haitian hands” such as Mike Wallace of CBS’ “60
Minutes,” Actors Martin Balsam and Ali McGraw -- along with many others
who had spent time there -- see the absolute craziness of this piece of
our so-called foreign policy.
Twenty-five thousand troops? Haitian armored vehicles?
In my numerous trips to Haiti, including the two on my mission impossible,
the only armored vehicle I ever saw was an old tank on the Presidential
Palace grounds. The story was they were trying to move it to some other
location, apparently in the Papa Doc era, when the motor died and it was
left there to rust as a kind of oxymoronic symbol of Haitian military
power.
The CIA did not have to depend on the U.S. embassy military attaches and
CIA spook contingent in Port-au-Prince to size up the Haitian military
threat to our troops invading the country.
Its operatives could have gone there as tourists and traveled the country
freely to make an estimate of Haiti’s pathetic military situation. Having
thought about it many times, I cannot believe those young Haitian army
guys loafing around the Cedras house perimeter would have fired a shot had
a few Marines appeared at the gate in one Humvee.
But Clinton, perhaps out of jealousy, underestimated Carter. Just before
troops were to land at the Port-au-Prince airport, the former president on
Sunday, Sept.19 reached an agreement with Cedras and other Haitian
government officials to leave the country the next day. Or so he thought.
Kozak was in Port-au-Prince then and I assume (but do not know for sure)
he was at Carter’s side during the negotiations at the Army headquarters
and elsewhere.
After Kozak returned to Washington, he told me the U.S. delegation still
in Haiti (Carter had left the country Sunday night before the U.S. troops
began landing) went to Cedras’ office on Monday morning. A motorcade was
waiting to take Cedras and his family to the airport, where they would be
flown to exile in Panama.
Cedras, Kozak said, showed up as if it was business as usual and his
agreement with Carter the evening before had never happened. The Americans
were stunned, but immediately told the general transportation was waiting
to take his family to the airport. U.S. troops already were on the ground
there and his rule of Haiti was over.
According to Madame X, Mike Kozak had misunderstood the Cedras appearance
at the Army headquarters on Monday morning. She said he had only gone to
say goodbye to his staff.
Madame X also said she was present when the Cedras family left their home
for the last time, and it was around 11:30 p.m. on Monday. From the
house’s position high up on the mountain above Port-au-Prince, she watched
the lights of a plane fully loaded with the junta members fly out of
Haiti.
On March 3, 2004 Secretary of State Colin Powell testified before the
House Subcommittee on State department Appropriations about his role in
the negotiations with Cedras.
Earlier I wrote one of my primary judgments about people is whether or not
they have a sense of humor, and I quickly found Gen. Cedras did. While I
had not seen the House hearing transcript until months after I wrote about
the Cedras humor, one Powell anecdote in his testimony certainly confirms
it. The committee is chaired by Rep. Frank Wolf (R-VA).
Here it is:
WOLF: Mr. Kirk? (Mark Kirk, R-IL, a member of the subcommittee)
KIRK: Mr. Secretary, where were you on September 18th, 1994?
POWELL: (inaudible)
KIRK: You were actually...
POWELL: I know where I was.
KIRK: Yes.
POWELL: I was in Port-au-Prince.
KIRK: You were. My boss was on the phone with you. He was the duty
captain in the Navy command center. It was about 11 o'clock at night.
Shield teams had already surrounded you and there were a lot of bull's
eyes on you and General Cedrus (ph). We ordered you to leave, if you
remember. I think the conversation went something like, "Sir" -- you were
a civilian at that point -- "Sir, you have to leave right now." with a
very authoritative (inaudible) Navy 06 who did that.
And you said, "I'm not leaving." And we had already given the go-order to
the teams to blow the place to smithereens to take out General Cedrus
(ph). And it was with considerable personal bravery on your part that you
overrode the plan. Can you talk something about that evening? You talked
about running around in a truck with a bunch of grenades.
POWELL: It was perhaps one of the most interesting days and
evenings of my life, humorous in retrospect. These things always tend to
be humorous in retrospect when they are terrifying when occurring. But we
were in the presidential palace -- or rather the government offices across
from the presidential palace -- working with General Cedrus (ph), who WAS
the head of the coup government, and General Biamby (ph) and several other
Haitian generals. And the general from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was
with us and supporting us in the negotiations, he pulled me aside and he
said to me at one point, "We're in the window." I said, "We're in the
window? What window?" Because I thought we had another day or two before
President Clinton had ordered the operation, only to discover, he said,
"No, it's not another day or two. Planes will be taking off in a few hours
and they're coming here."
POWELL: I then notified my two colleagues, President Carter and
Senator Sam Nunn, that the negotiations had to be speeded up considerably.
And we did. And in one of the most fascinating conversations I've ever
had, I looked across the table at General Cedrus (ph) and I told him,
"We're entering at a time we've got to bring this to a conclusion and
you've got to go." And myself, President Carter and Senator Nunn in the
room with the Haitian generals and one or two other Americans taking
notes, and with guns laying in various corners, and I kept eyeing the
closest M- 16 to see if I could beat General Cedrus and General Biamby to
it if the time came.
And I started to explain to them what was coming and made sure the force
that was being assembled and might be dispatched at any moment, not
telling them that they had already been dispatched and were taking off
from Pope Air Force Base in North Carolina.
And when I got to explaining it all to General Cedrus (ph) what was coming
-- President Carter loves to tell this story -- General Cedrus (ph) looked
at me and he said, "All that's coming, huh?" I said, "Yep." And he said,
"We used to be the weakest military force in the hemisphere, and we're now
about to become the biggest military force in the hemisphere when all that
arrives." It broke the tension and it made it clear to them that it was
time to go. And so they said, "Fine, but we can't go. We have to go see
the president," who was just a caretaker gentleman, a distinguished old
gentleman. And we only had about 20 or 30 minutes left and we raced out of
the building to go to the presidential palace. President Carter ran out
the front door with his Secret Service agents, and Senator Nunn was right
behind him, but I got delayed. So I went down the back steps with the
generals, the Haitian generals, and we jumped in the back of a Suburban.
By now, I was all alone, no other Americans with me, and General Cedrus
(ph) and General Biamby (ph) and a few other people with guns and
ammunition and hand grenades rolling all over the floor of the jeep or
whatever it was.
POWELL: And we took off. And it was my fondest hope that we were
planning to catch up with President Carter over at the presidential palace
-- which we did. We went in and had a fascinating conversation with the
president. And the generals needed somebody to tell them to cut the deal
and leave. And that individual at that time, just as a caretaker president
said, "I'm the president. Do it." the generals accepted the order with a
little bit of resistance. I had to say another few words to them. And
President Carter and Senator Nunn and I raced out, got in our car so that
we could call President Clinton and let him know that it was not necessary
to invade, they could land safely the next morning, and hope that would be
the case, and it was the case.
KIRK: I was on the other end. We made hundreds of calls because we
had already told units, "Take out your target," and you called us back.
But it's ironic that the three decades in service and uniform, you had
retired, and you did this as a private citizen. You risked your life to
bring democracy back to Haiti. You risked your life to bring Aristide back
to power. Do you sense the irony and blasting you now on this point?
POWELL: Of course. President Aristide was elected in 1990 and was
forced out of office. We support democracy. We knew at that time, 1991-92,
while we were still in office, President Bush, that President Aristide was
not a perfect individual. He was flawed. There were aspects to his
behavior, there were aspects to his performance and his ability that
caused us deep concern. But we recognized him. And he lived in Washington
during his periods of exile. And when the new administration came in, the
administration, President Clinton and his team tried to find a solution to
it, it was called the Governor's Island Agreement with General Cedrus (ph)
and President Aristide, but it fell apart. And I was out in private life
when the situation got worse, and President Clinton decided that he had to
do something about it.
POWELL: But I'll never forget on that September weekend, President
Clinton decided that he should try one last time to see if it could be
done peacefully. He had to go in. The military was going in. He had made
that decision. I didn't necessarily agree with it at the time, but he had
made the decision. And he called President Carter and asked if he would do
it. And then President Clinton called Senator Nunn, and then President
Clinton called me after I talked to President Carter and said, if he
wanted me to do it I would. And so I did it. It was on a Friday night when
we decided to go.
KIRK: We thank you for that.
Gen. Powell’s life in danger?
This is a rather dramatic recalling
by Gen. Powell of one phase of the negotiations with Gen. Cedras and other
Haitian officials.
Except for one detail.
I have great respect for Gen.
Powell and his long and outstanding service to his country in the Army and
as Secretary of State. But his testimony before the subcommittee is
puzzling. I do not understand how he could have so badly judged the
negotiation situation to think Cedras or anyone else in that room would
have grabbed a weapon to harm members of the U. S. delegation.
Moreover, I have since confirmed
that Gen. Cedras had absolutely no intention of using Haitian military to
in any way to oppose U.S. forces during an invasion of Haiti.
Cedras, still in exile in Panama,
is refusing to give interviews until after his own story is published in a
book. But if and when his book is published, I believe it will verify what
I have learned indirectly. I also am quite certain there will be no
mention in my involvement from December, 1993 to September, 1994.
Aristide returned to Haiti to resume power on Oct. 19, 1994. Years later
with Haiti again in political turmoil Aristide, with the blessings of our
government, once again was flown to safety outside of Haiti as a small
group leading a revolution was ready to storm the presidential palace.
So, in the end the departure of Cedras, his top military leaders and the
civilian thugs supporting his coup was exactly by the plan I had proposed
to the general (and his wife) during my first trip on this mission.
First, former President Carter, my primary choice as a high-level
negotiator with Cedras, actually became involved at the request of the
general.
Second, Cedras finally honored his commitment in the Governor’s Island
Accord and left Haiti under the amnesty agreement in that document.
Third, the Cedras family did no doubt receive some financial incentive for
its future in exile. Reliable sources have told me the U.S. government
agreed to rent his home in Petitionville, his beach house and one owned by
Yanick’s mother. For anyone who cares, the Cedras house was much smaller
and considerably more modest than ones I had seen rented there by
low-level U.S. embassy staff.
Other end notes.
Perhaps the biggest surprise which came about years after the beginning of
my coming on the scene in the Haitian crisis was the involvement of a
longtime acquaintance.
His name was Robert McCandless. And McCandless and I had connections
galore.
Growing up in the small town of Rocky, Oklahoma when I was first allowed
to buy my own clothes at the age of sixteen or seventeen I bought them
from McCandless’ parents who owned a clothing store in the nearby town of
Hobart.
Then, one of my part time jobs after I left the Navy and enrolled at the
University of Oklahoma in Norman was working at a men’s clothing store
with Robert’s older brother, John.
In 1961 when I was appointed press secretary to Oklahoma’s powerful senior
senator, Robert S. Kerr, a Democrat, I found Robert on the staff as a sort
of gofer while he was a student at one of the local universities. He later
earned a law degree from the University of Oklahoma.
While doing research for this article I found McCandless had been retained
in some way for $10,000 a month to represent the Government of Haiti in
Washington.
When I conveyed this startling information to Madame X, she called Yannik
Cedras in Panama for an explanation. What she got was a cold shoulder.
Time went by then in at some time later for some reason I can’t remember I
went to the Justice Department’s Foreign Agent Registration Agency (FARA)
to check on those registering as representatives of the Haitian
government.
What I found was even more surprising.
McCandless had cut himself a whale of a deal far beyond the fee structure
I originally found on the Internet.
Indeed he had registered with the Justice department’s foreign agent
registration branch (FARA) and its records show several filings of
amendments to what apparently was the original contract.
Among the McCandless law firm filings at FARA is a letter to Joseph
Nerette, provisional president of Haiti, dated March 13, 1992, in which he
acknowledges receiving $85,000.
The letter continues:
“It is agreed that this balance of US$80,000 shall be paid as soon as
possible, but no later than by April 14, 1992, to insure that the retainer
is paid in full during the first month so nothing can disturb our work in
behalf of the PGH.”
In another paragraph of the same letter McCandless outlines the bonuses to
be paid should “we accomplish the defacto or the official lifting
of a majority of the U.S. boycott within two (2) months.”
One bonus would be 100 percent of the McCandless firm’s $165,000 contract
if the boycott was lifted in two months or 50 percent if done in four to
six months and 25 percent if it took longer.
Later filings by McCandless indicate little if any additional funds were
forthcoming from Haiti and he notes his work in amendment filings is being
done pro bono except for a few thousand dollars for expenses.
Called “contingency provisions” by FARA, such bonuses are strictly
forbidden by law and it’s surprising McCandless did not incur a Justice
department civil suit by so blatantly listing the bonus provision.
Also listed in the McCandless filings is Craig Shirley, noting he would be
involved in Haiti’s public relations activities.
Shirley is not unknown on the Washington scene. A conservative political
consultant, Politico reported on May 15, 2008 that Sen. John McCain had
fired Shirley from his presidential campaign staff for a conflict of
interest.
In the story, Politico also notes Shirley allegedly was a member of the
campaign team that created the “Willie Horton” ads that trashed Michael
Dukakis’ candidacy representing the Democrats in the 1988 presidential
campaign.
On the first reading of the Carter Center’s Web site description of the
former president’s conflict resolution in Haiti http://www.cartercenter.org/search/viewindexdoc.asp,
it’s really amusing to think about Carter, Nunn and Powell running around
Port-au-Prince negotiating with other Haitian officials besides Cedras.
Among those listed by the Carter Center as being involved in the
negotiations are Brig. Gen. Phillips Biamby and President Emile Jonassaint.
Exactly what role Col. Michel Francois, the powerful Port-au-Prince police
chief, had in these negotiations is not mentioned on the Center’s Web
site.
However, a March 8, 1997 New York Times story reported that a Joseph
Michel Francois, former Port-au-Prince police chief, had been indicted in
Miami on charges he had helped smuggle 66,000 pounds of Columbian cocaine
and heroin into the U.S.
Haitians at that time were not so ignorant of world affairs they did not
know of the U.S. military might once President Clinton unleashed it for an
invasion there. And many Haitians are much aware of the long history of
U.S. troops invading their country.
But I think Clinton was determined the crisis be resolved without
bloodshed. And likely the Carter delegation was striving for the same
goal. Otherwise, when Carter learned our troops were airborne and on their
way to Haiti, he had no reason for wasting his time talking to the junta
members.
As for possible bloodshed, if Carter had never gone to meet with Cedras I
doubt anyone would have been wounded or killed. Cedras, as a man trained
by the U.S. military, understood wasting his Army troops against the vast
American forces would be sheer idiocy. And Gen. Cedras did not strike me
as an idiot.
Madame X, who called to get me involved in the Haitian crisis, still after
all these years remains a valued friend. While we totally failed in all
our efforts to bring about a “regime change” in Haiti, we can be content
with the satisfaction of having played a small role in the continued
feeding by the relief groups of almost a million Haitians.
I
know Gerard Latortue, the interim prime minister, who was put into power
with U.S. backing after Aristide’s latest departure from Haiti. He is a
retired UN official who was living peacefully in Florida when asked to try
to run a Haitian government in shambles.
But, it’s apparently nothing but business as usual down there. And when
the hurricane hit Haiti in September, 2004 one of the TV networks reported
CARE and other charities were on the scene – but no one from the
Government of Haiti. You might say it was Latortue’s “Katrina.”
On one of my trips to Haiti to negotiate with Cedras, I was introduced to
a young female lawyer named Mireille (pronounced me-ray) Bertin.
Mireille was not so much pro-Cedras as she was anti-Aristide. And she was
very vocal in her beliefs.
I
was quite fond of Mireille, and was welcomed to her home where I met her
husband, a private pilot, and their young children.
Soon after Aristide returned to power, Mireille was assassinated while
driving in the downtown area of Port-au-Prince.
It’s difficult to put her death in perspective, considering the thousands
of other Haitians who died in that period of time.
Is there really a difference between a person being assassinated by
political enemies and those starved to death because of political
decisions?
I
can’t really answer that question. But I can say, however, that when it is
a death of someone I know and admire the pain in my heart is much, much
deeper.
Finally, for any who might read my recollection, if I heard this tale from
someone in the public sector, relatively unknown, with no background in
diplomacy, I frankly would not believe them.
What after all these years seems so amazing was that Gen. Cedras, and most
importantly his wife, immediately accepted me as someone who might be of
help in a crazy, crazy situation.
I
have no plans to visit Panama. But if I ever do, I hope I will have the
opportunity to sit down with the general and Madame Cedras over a drink
and perhaps find the answer to that question. Otherwise, since no one else
can really tell me, I will never know.
John Martin
Meek
Postscript:
This story has been written over a period of several years including at
least eight years of research trying to get two Pearl Harbor heroes
upgraded from the Distinguished Service Cross to the Congressional Medal
of Honor www.pearlharborhero.net.
The research has involved countless hours as I strived for accuracy in
telling a story that began in 1993 without, as I have said, my diaries for
1993 and 1994 when my small role in the Haitian fiasco was taking place.
But it was never intended as an historical document, just another tale of
my continual tilting at windmills.
Also, I have made little effort to insert or list the dozens of Web sites
I have visited during this project. They are many, but few reflecting what
in my opinion is a real understanding of Haiti and its people.
I did go back to Haiti on vacation once more after Aristide was returned
to power. By the second day, hairs were rising on the back of my neck and
my instincts were telling me my life was in danger.
Perhaps it was just the thoughts about Mirielle’s bold and brutal
assassination. In addition, there were Haitians still around who knew of
my relationship with Cedras and might have perceived me as someone trying
to keep him in power. I’m sure my life was not in danger, but I packed up
and flew back to DC anyway. And if someone down there has been sticking
pins in a John Meek voodoo doll, perhaps that accounts for my aching back.
And one final irony. After Barrack Obama was elected president, who should
be sent as a special United Nations envoy to Haiti but none other than the
man who had a major role in additional destruction of the little nation –
former President Bill Clinton.
